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ABSTRACT 
 
This Article argues that the current approach of the Department of 
Health and Human Services and the Centers for Medicare and Medi-
caid Services (CMS) to enforcement of the Ethics in Patient Referrals 
Act (the “Stark Law”) is unnecessarily punitive and discourages 
health-care providers from self-disclosing even very minor violations 
of the Stark Law.  This Article suggests a number of specific changes 
to encourage provider self-disclosure and proposes that CMS create a 
demonstration project under the authority of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act to test the reforms.  A demonstration project pro-
vides the perfect vehicle to prove that increased self-disclosure proto-
cols for the Stark Law can decrease the government’s costs of en-
forcement, improve program integrity, and encourage providers to 
deal responsibly with the inevitable minor lapses in compliance that 
arise in such an enormous government program as Medicare.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Benjamin Franklin, that astute observer of nature and humanity, 
once described his approach to making difficult decisions in terms that 
sound quite modern.  He said that when he had a difficult decision to 
make, “[t]o get over [any uncertainty] . . . my way is to divide half a 
sheet of paper by a line into two columns; writing over the one Pro, 
and the other Con.  Then . . . I put down under the different heads 
short hints of the different motives . . . for and against the measure . . . 
.”1  Mr. Franklin further opined that other people using a similar ap-
proach are more likely to take a particular action once they see clearly 
how they would benefit from taking the action.  Before the complexity 
of the formulas, graphs, and charts of modern cost-benefit analysis, 
Franklin summed it up quite simply: “[A] spoonful of honey will 
catch more flies than [a] [g]allon of [v]inegar.”2   
This Article argues that the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) and its constituent agency, the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS), are using vinegar instead of honey in 
CMS’s current approach to enforcement of the Ethics in Patient Refer-
rals Act of 1988, commonly referred to as the “Stark Law,” or simply 
“Stark,” in honor of its author, Representative Pete Stark.3  The Stark 
Law prohibits physicians from referring Medicare patients for certain 
services to entities in which the physician has a financial interest, un-
less an exception applies.4  Stark is extremely detailed and does not 
require the element of intent to trigger legal liability.  As a result, it is 
quite easy for health-care providers to unwittingly run afoul of the 
law, leaving them liable to repay fees earned for patient care, in addi-
tion to civil penalties. 
  
 1 Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Joseph Priestley (Sept. 19, 1772) (em-
phasis in original) (on file with the Library of Congress). 
 2 RICHARD SAUNDERS, POOR RICHARD, AN ALMANACK (1744) (quoting Ben-
jamin Franklin) (on file with Yale University Library). 
 3 Limitation on Certain Physician Referrals (Stark Law), 42 U.S.C. § 
1395nn (2006).  The Stark Law and supporting regulations have been modified sig-
nificantly over the years to add or expand covered designated health services and 
exceptions.  This Article refers to the laws and regulations collectively as “Stark” or 
“the Stark Law” unless otherwise noted. 
 4 Prohibition on Certain Referrals by Physicians (Stark Regulations), 42 
C.F.R §§ 411.353-411.389 (2010).  Some of the more commonly relied upon excep-
tions include those for services performed personally by or under the personal super-
vision of a physician in the same group practice as the referring physician; services 
provided ancillary to the physician’s or group’s own professional services; personal 
services arrangements meeting specific requirements; isolated transactions such as the 
sale of a practice; and fair market value compensation documented in a specific man-
ner prescribed by the regulations. 
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The Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA)5 required CMS to de-
velop a procedure by which health-care providers could self-disclose 
violations of the Stark Law.6  The statute also explicitly gave CMS the 
authority to reduce the financial penalties for Stark violations as a way 
to encourage providers to self-disclose violations.7  Congress included 
these provisions in the ACA in response to providers’ requests.  In-
deed, before the self-disclosure protocol was released, many health-
care providers were hopeful that CMS would create a protocol that 
would provide relief from the draconian penalties that can result from 
very minor infractions of the Stark Law.  For example, the American 
Hospital Association (AHA) wrote a letter to HHS Secretary Kathleen 
Sebelius urging that HHS use the discretion given it under the ACA to 
“offer providers a clear and understandable process for presenting and 
resolving disclosed issues—a framework that is fair; adjusts repay-
ments to the harm, if any, to patients and the program; takes [the] fi-
nancial condition of the provider into account; and offers reasonable 
certainty or predictability of outcomes.”8 
In September 2010, CMS released its Self-Referral Disclosure 
Protocol (SRDP), with a slightly revised version released on May 6, 
2011.9  Unfortunately, the SRDP is so punitive and difficult to navi-
gate that very few health-care providers have made disclosures, de-
spite specific legal requirements to do so.  As will be detailed in this 
Article, the program takes a harder line, provides less guidance, and 
offers fewer incentives to use the protocol than similar self-disclosure 
protocols, such as those employed by HHS’s Office of Inspector Gen-
eral for the Anti-Kickback Statute and by New York State for its 
Medicaid program.10 
  
 5 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111–152, 123 Stat. 1029 (2010) (to be codified as amended at various 
sections of Title 42 of the United States Code). 
5 Id. § 6409 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn note). 
 6 Id. 
 7 See id. 
 8 Letter from Rick Pollack, Exec. Vice President, Am. Hosp. Ass’n, to Kath-
leen Sebelius, Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & Human Serv’s 3 (July 16, 2010) [hereinafter 
AHA Letter], http://www.aha.org/aha/letter/2010/100716-cl-ppaca.pdf.   
 9 See CMS Voluntary Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol, CMS.GOV (revised 
May 6 , 2011) [hereinafter SRDP], 
http://www.cms.gov/PhysicianSelfReferral/Downloads/6409_SRDP_Protocol.pdf. 
 10  See infra Part III. 
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As of July 2011, only seventy providers had taken advantage of 
the SRDP.11  CMS has stated that it is pleased with the numbers to 
date.12  However, when those seventy disclosures are viewed in the 
context of the Medicare program as a whole, it is difficult to under-
stand why CMS is happy with those numbers.  There are over 6,100 
hospitals and 932,700 physicians participating in the Medicare pro-
gram.13  Hospitals are the focus of this Article, as physicians are rarely 
prosecuted under Stark.14   
Consider the number of potential Stark issues at those 6,100 hos-
pitals.  Even the smallest hospital has numerous contracts with physi-
cians that create potential Stark issues.15  But assume for a moment 
that each hospital has a few hundred to a thousand or more such ar-
rangements.  Kevin McAnaney, a former CMS official now in private 
practice, has estimated that 95 percent of hospitals have “technical” 
violations of Stark arising out of their arrangements with physicians.16  
McAnaney did not define a “technical,” as opposed to a substantive, 
violation.  It is likely he was referring to a violation of the regulations 
that specify exactly how an arrangement can fall under a Stark excep-
tion.  For example, one exception to Stark permits self-referrals by 
physicians if the remuneration is at fair market value.17  For an ar-
  
11 Katherine A. Lauer & Robert L. Roth, Am. Health Lawyers Ass’n Webinar Presen-
tation, Medicare Repayments and Disclosures , at 23 (June 16, 2011) (on file with 
author).  
 12 Julie E. Kass et al., Seven Months Later: An Interactive Dialogue Regard-
ing Initial Experiences and Practical Advice in Dealing with CMS’ Self-Referral 
Disclosure Protocol, AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS’N (Apr. 11, 2011) 
http://www.healthlawyers.org/Events/Webinars/RoundtableDiscussions/2011/Docum
ents/roundtable_discussion_recording_041111.mp3. 
 13 2010 Edition: Data Compendium, CMS.GOV (2010), 
https://www.cms.gov/DataCompendium/downloads/2010ProvidersSupp.zip (accord-
ing to Providers Table VI.1 & VI.6, over 95 percent of physicians are Medicare pro-
gram participants). 
 14 See infra Part I.A. 
 15 CMS Postpones Hospital Reporting of Disclosure of Financial Relation-
ships Report (DFRR), CMS.GOV [hereinafter DFRR], 
https://www.cms.gov/PhysicianSelfReferral/70_Disclosure.asp#TopOfPage (last 
visited July 25, 2011).  DFRR, initially proposed in 2008, would have required hospi-
tals to document and disclose to CMS all financial relationships with physicians.  Id.  
After multiple CMS modifications of timeline and cost estimates, DFRR reporting 
was delayed pending implementation of new hospital disclosure requirements under 
PPACA § 6001.  Id. 
 16 OIG ‘Open Letter’ to Industry Cites Kickbacks in Self-Disclosure Proto-
col, 13 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) 258 (2009). 
 17 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(3) (2006).  Fair market value is broadly considered 
to be the value of arms-length transactions, consistent with general market value.  
Where applicable, fair market value also factors in the value of rental property for 
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rangement to jump that hurdle, it must meet several procedural re-
quirements, including that the arrangement be set out in a written 
document signed by the parties, and specify the compensation in ad-
vance.18  Failure to follow those steps probably constitutes the sort of 
“technical” violation to which McAnaney refers.  
Even if McAnaney’s estimate is largely hyperbole, it is clear that 
thousands of hospitals, each with thousands of physician relation-
ships, should generate many more than seventy self-disclosures.  The 
former New York State Medicaid Inspector General, James Sheehan, 
said that he considers the number and extent of disclosures a good 
outcome measure of his agency’s effectiveness in running the New 
York State Medicaid self-disclosure program.19  Applying that meas-
ure to the CMS program, it is a dismal failure. 
The fact that providers are, by and large, not choosing to self-
disclose Stark violations to CMS, despite the enormous penalties for 
nondisclosure,20 should cause CMS to rethink the current SRDP.  Pro-
viders do have other options for self-disclosure of various fraud and 
abuse issues.  These include (1) simple refunds to the appropriate fis-
cal intermediary, (2) self-disclosure of an issue involving the Anti-
Kickback Statute to the HHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG), 
or, for the most serious matters, (3) a report to the Department of Jus-
tice (DOJ) through the local Assistant U.S. Attorney.  For Stark-only 
issues, however, CMS has stated that providers should use its proto-
col, the SRDP.  If providers choose not to take advantage of this op-
portunity to come forward voluntarily, the government fails to recover 
money that the Medicare program is owed.  Costs of enforcement are 
then unnecessarily high, and providers who might voluntarily return 
overpayments if the incentives were properly aligned choose instead 
to roll the dice and hope they do not get caught.   
HHS is under tremendous pressure to recover program dollars lost 
to fraud.  The National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association, an orga-
nization of private insurers and public agencies, conservatively esti-
mates that some $60 billion (about 3 percent of total annual health-
  
general commercial use, less any value for proximity or convenience as a potential 
source of patient referrals.  Id. 
 18 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(1)(A) (rental of office space or equip-
ment); id. § 1395nn(e)(3) (personal services arrangements). 
 19 James Sheehan, & Robert Hussar, Self-Disclosures by Medicaid Providers, 
N.Y. OFF. OF MEDICAID INSPECTOR GEN. 38 (Sept. 14, 2010), 
http://www.omig.ny.gov/data/images/stories/Webinar/9-14-
10_omig_self_disclosure_webinar.pdf. 
 20 See infra Part II. 
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care spending) is lost to fraud every year.21  During the congressional 
debate on the ACA, proponents of the bill touted fraud recovery as an 
important source of funding to counterbalance the costs of extending 
insurance coverage to millions of new people.22  During fiscal year 
2010, the federal government won or negotiated approximately $2.5 
billion in health-care fraud judgments and settlements,
 
and attained 
additional administrative settlements or penalties.23  In an attempt to 
raise that number even higher, the ACA increased the budget of the 
Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program by $10 million per 
year for 2011–2019, and increased funding for the OIG, FBI, and 
Medicare Integrity Program by the rate of increase in the Consumer 
Price Index over the previous year for 2011–2019.24 
However, as Professor Joan Krause pointed out in a recent article, 
while billions of dollars in fraud recovery may seem like a lot of 
money, it pales in comparison to estimates of money lost each year to 
fraud.25  Krause also makes the point that more resources allocated to 
prosecution will not necessarily result in increased fraud recovery:   
 
If it were really that easy to recover hundreds of bil-
lions of dollars through anti-fraud efforts, chances are 
we would have made more progress by now.  It is easy 
to blame our failure on the refusal to invest sufficient 
resources, or our blind adherence to outdated detection 
strategies.  But that doesn’t account for the fact that 
legions of very bright, dedicated, well-intentioned 
policymakers and prosecutors have been doing the best 
they can for many years, with only limited success.  
Assuming that now we will be able to find the key to 
health care fraud enforcement—and that the recoveries 
  
 21 Vicki Lee Parker, Treasure Might be Buried in Medical Bills, NAT’L 
HEALTH CARE ANTI-FRAUD ASS’N (Apr. 12, 2007, 7:15 AM), 
http://www.nhcaa.org/eweb/dynamicPage.aspx?webcode=about_nhcaa&wpscode=Tr
easuremightbeburiedinmedicalbills. 
 22 John K. Iglehart, Finding Money for Health Care Reform – Rooting Out 
Waste, Fraud, and Abuse, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 229, 229-31 (2009) (discussing 
governmental efforts to strengthen antifraud measures to increase recoupment of 
improper payments). 
 23 DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV’S. & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE 
FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 8 
(2011), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/hcfac/hcfacreport2010.pdf. 
 24 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 
6402(i), 124 Stat. 119, 760 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395(i)(k)). 
 25 Joan H. Krause, Following the Money in Health Care Fraud:  Reflections 
on a Modern-Day Yellow Brick Road, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 343, 355–56 (2010) (dis-
cussing difficulties with calculating the amount of money attributed to fraud). 
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will be enough to fund a large chunk of the health care 
reform effort—simply strains credulity.26 
 
While it is undoubtedly important for CMS to protect the public 
fisc generally, and the tremendously expensive Medicare program in 
particular, this Article argues that more provider-friendly rules and 
procedures would encourage provider self-disclosure of improper 
practices, thus improving the government’s recovery of health-care 
program dollars more effectively than pouring larger and larger 
amounts of money into increasing enforcement efforts.   
This Article sets out in Part I an overview of the Stark Law, ex-
plaining how it applies to physicians, hospitals, and other health-care 
entities.  Part II summarizes the SRDP requirements and process for 
disclosure of Stark issues, and the results of the SRDP to date.  Part 
III details why certain SRDP provisions make it difficult for providers 
to self-disclose even minor violations of Stark without paying large 
fines and/or risking exclusion from the Medicare or Medicaid pro-
gram.  Finally, Part IV proposes a demonstration project to test possi-
ble improvements to the SRDP.   
HHS has used demonstration or pilot projects in the past, and the 
ACA specifically directs HHS to create projects that offer the possi-
bility of reducing Medicare and Medicaid expenditures while preserv-
ing or enhancing the quality of care provided in the programs.27  Us-
ing the demonstration project format to test changes to the SRDP in a 
few states will allow CMS to determine whether it could relax the 
protocol’s current requirements, making it more “provider-friendly” 
without increased risk of abuse.  If the test is successful in terms of 
revenue raised and increased provider compliance with the law, CMS 
could then revise the SRDP through the normal regulatory process.  A 
demonstration project provides the perfect vehicle to prove that im-
proved self-disclosure protocols for the Stark Law can decrease en-
forcement costs, improve program integrity, and encourage providers 
to deal responsibly with the minor lapses in compliance that inevitably 
arise in such an enormous government program as Medicare.   
 
  
 26 Id. at 364. 
 27 See § 3021(a), 124 Stat. at 389 (creating the Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Innovation). 
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I. BACKGROUND ON THE STARK LAW 
A. Basic Provisions 
The Stark Law limits a physician’s ability to refer patients for cer-
tain services to entities in which the physician or an immediate family 
member has a financial interest, unless an exception applies.28  It was 
originally enacted to curb rampant Medicare abuse by physicians and 
hospitals, particularly in the 1980s.  Physicians referred patients to 
facilities they owned or otherwise had a financial interest in, regard-
less of whether patients actually needed the tests or services for which 
they were being referred.29  The purpose of the law, as Rep. Stark 
described it, was threefold: (1) assure that physicians refer patients to 
the highest quality provider available rather than to a provider with 
whom the physician has a financial relationship, (2) prevent overutili-
zation of Medicare and Medicaid, and (3) promote legitimate competi-
tion among providers.30  Rep. Stark hoped that the law would provide 
a “bright line rule” and “unequivocal guidance” for providers.31   
The Stark Law prohibits physician referrals to an entity for “des-
ignated health services” if the physician (or a member of the physi-
cian’s immediate family) has a “financial relationship” with that en-
tity.32  The term “financial relationship” is defined very broadly.  It 
includes ownership and any type of compensation arrangement.33  
“Designated health services” include lab, radiology, inpatient, and 
outpatient hospital services, among other things.34  The Stark Law 
prohibits any entity from billing government payment programs, such 
as Medicare, for services provided pursuant to a noncompliant referral 
during the “period of disallowance.”35   
  
 28 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(b)-(e) (2006); 42 C.F.R. §§ 411.353(a), (e) (2010). 
 29 135 CONG. REC. 2035 (1989) (statement of Rep. Pete Stark, introducing 
the Ethics in Patient Referrals Act of 1988). 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(1); 42 C.F.R. §§ 411.353(a), (c)(1). 
 33 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(2); 42 C.F.R. § 411.354(a). 
 34 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(6); 42 C.F.R. § 411. 351. 
 35 42 C.F.R. § 411.353(c).  This period is defined as “starting on the date the 
financial relationship is first noncompliant and lasting until no later than (1) the date 
on which the financial relationship satisfies an exception; (2) the date on which all 
excess compensation is returned to the party that paid it; or (3) the date on which all 
additional required compensation is paid to the party to which it is owed.”  Lesley 
Reynolds & Ben Koplin, Overpayment Liability and Self-Disclosure Under the New 
CMS Protocol, J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE, May–June 2011, at 23, 24.  Because 
the regulation used “no later than,” rather than “the latter of,” the regulation could be 
seen as extending the period of disallowance “beyond the date the financial relation-
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The Stark Law applies to both Medicare36 and Medicaid;37 how-
ever, due to hospitals’ and physicians’ particular dependence on 
Medicare as a source of revenue, most commentators refer to the Stark 
Law’s application only in connection with Medicare.  Additionally, 
although the Stark Law addresses physician referrals, enforcement of 
the statute has generally focused on hospitals’ submissions of claims 
resulting from physician referral because hospitals are seen as having 
“deeper pockets” than physicians.38  As the American Health Lawyers 
Association (AHLA) White Paper on Stark Enforcement stated, 
“Stark enforcement against physicians is almost nonexistent and there 
is little reason to believe that will change.  Given this, it is not surpris-
ing the physicians often view Stark compliance as the hospital’s prob-
lem.”39  So as not to contribute to this misperception, this Article uses 
the term “provider” to reference physicians, hospitals, nursing homes, 
laboratories, medical device manufacturers, pharmaceutical compa-
nies, and any other provider of health-care services to recipients of 
federal government health-care program benefits.     
 
B. Application of the Stark Law   
Some of the common practices and arrangements that implicate 
Stark are referrals within a group practice, medical director agree-
ments and physician part-time employment or independent contractor 
agreements.40  Other situations in which Stark issues arise are physi-
cian investment in hospitals or ambulatory surgical centers, and ar-
rangements between physicians and other designated health service 
providers such as clinical laboratories, diagnostic imaging centers, 
physical therapy companies, durable medical equipment companies, 
and lease agreements for space or equipment.41  Other types of agree-
ments that raise Stark issues are hospital-physician recruitment 
agreements, marketing agreements with entities owned by physician 
  
ship is technically cured to the date on which any excess compensation is finally 
returned or money due is finally paid.”  Id.   
 36 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn. 
 37 42 C.F.R. § 411.353(a). 
 38 AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS’N, PUB. INTEREST COMM., A PUBLIC POLICY 
DISCUSSION:  TAKING THE MEASURE OF THE STARK LAW 5 (2009) [hereinafter WHITE 
PAPER], 
http://www.healthlawyers.org/hlresources/PI/Policy/Documents/Stark%20White%20
Paper.pdf. 
 39 Id. at 10.   
 40 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(b), (e)(2), (e)(4); 42 C.F.R. §§ 411.355, 411.357(c), 
(g), (h).   
 41 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(e)(1), (8); 42 C.F.R. §§ 411.357(a), (b), (i), (k), (l), 
(p). 
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or hospital investors that do not reflect fair market value for necessary 
services, and practice compensation programs that reward sharehold-
ers or employee-physicians based on orders of designated health serv-
ices.42 
The reason that these practices and arrangements often pass mus-
ter is that Stark contains numerous exceptions, covering the most 
common types of financial relationships between hospitals and physi-
cians.  For example, exceptions are made for fair market value com-
pensation, employment agreements, personal services arrangements, 
and office space rental.43  There are also numerous exceptions appli-
cable to physicians practicing in groups,44 as well as an exception for 
services personally performed by a physician.45  Each of these excep-
tions has very specific requirements, and failure to meet those re-
quirements will result in a Stark violation.  For example, the employ-
ment exception requires that there be a written agreement for a term of 
at least one year that is signed by both parties.  The agreement must 
set out the compensation formula, which cannot change during the 
term of the agreement.  The compensation must be at fair market 
value, and may not be determined in a manner that takes into account 
the volume or value of referrals generated by the physician.46   
An example will help illustrate the interplay of these various pro-
visions.  Suppose the fictional infectious disease specialist, Dr. Greg-
ory House,47 has a thriving private practice in addition to his employ-
ment at the Princeton-Plainsboro Teaching Hospital.  He refers many 
patients to the hospital each year for inpatient admission or for various 
diagnostic or treatment services.  Absent an exception in the Stark 
Law, Dr. House’s employment relationship with the hospital would 
“taint” his referrals to the hospital.  However, as long as the hospital 
and Dr. House meet all the technical requirements of the employment 
exception, Dr. House can refer patients to the hospital without trigger-
ing either the referral or billing prohibitions of the Stark law. 
 
  
 42 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(e)(3)(B), (e)(5); 42 C.F.R. §§ 411.357(e), (i), (k), (l), 
(p). 
 43 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (e); 42 C.F.R. § 411.357.  
 44 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b); 42 C.F.R. § 411.355. 
 45 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(3)(A); 42 C.F.R. § 411.357(d). 
 46 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(2); 42 C.F.R. § 411.357(c). 
 47 House (FOX Broadcasting Co. Nov. 16, 2004). 
180 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 22:169] 
C. Stark and Intent  
The Stark Law overlaps significantly the Anti-Kickback Statute,48 
a criminal law which prohibits the knowing offering of any remunera-
tion in order to secure referrals to federal health-care programs, in-
cluding Medicare.49  Similar to Stark, the Anti-Kickback Statute is 
aimed at financial relationships that potentially influence physicians to 
refer patients inappropriately for the physicians’ own financial gain.50  
So why was the Stark law necessary?  Rep. Stark described it this 
way: 
One of the most serious shortcoming[s] of current law 
is the enormous difficulty involved in proving to the 
satisfaction of a judge in a criminal or civil enforce-
ment action that a particular arrangement is deliber-
ately structured to induce referrals.  A successful 
prosecution requires a lengthy investigation of the 
business records to prove unequivocally that dividend 
payments to physicians were intended as disguised 
payment of a referral fee.  The enforcement resources 
simply aren’t there.  There is no way that the Inspector 
General—with fewer than 500 investigators nation-
wide, can adequately police the complex business ar-
rangements that underpin the $100 billion a year 
Medicare program.51   
 
While the lack of an intent requirement certainly achieves Rep. 
Stark’s goal of making a Stark violation easier to prove than a viola-
tion of the Anti-Kickback Statute, it also makes it very easy for pro-
viders to unintentionally, or even unknowingly, run afoul of the stat-
ute.  In fact, it is so easy to do so that the Stark Law is often referred 
to as a “strict liability” statute.52  For example, if Dr. House forgot to 
sign the employment contract between himself and Princeton-
Plainsboro, any referrals he made to the hospital would be improper, 
even if the failure to sign was merely an oversight.  This would be 
true even if the hospital signed the agreement, paid Dr. House accord-
  
 48 Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2011). 
 49 Id.  
 50 135 CONG. REC. 2035 (1989). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Richard Lower & Robert D. Stone, Off with Their Heads!  Summary Exe-
cution for Technical Stark Violations – and a Proposal to Commute the Sentence, J. 
HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L., Apr. 2010, at 112, 147 (discussing the strict liability nature of 
Stark violations despite no intent and no harm brought to patients or the public); 
Reynolds & Koplin, supra note 35, at 24 (no showing of intent required under Stark). 
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ing to its terms at fair market value, and made sure that Dr. House 
performed the duties set out in the contract.  Dr. House and the hospi-
tal would also be liable for Stark violations if both parties had prop-
erly signed the agreement but its initial term had lapsed, and the par-
ties inadvertently failed to renew the agreement, but continued to per-
form according to its terms.   
The lack of an intent requirement coupled with the complexity of 
the law has caused Stark to be criticized as inflexible and excessively 
punitive almost since its passage.53  Numerous amendments and HHS 
regulatory changes have only made the Stark Law more difficult for 
providers to interpret and follow.54  The AHA recently described the 
Stark Laws as “increasingly complex, confusing and continually 
changing . . . .”55  Though the AHA had originally supported the Stark 
Law when it was introduced by Rep. Stark, as CMS was preparing to 
release the SRDP, it asked CMS for changes and clarifications in the 
proposed disclosure protocol, because it had seen the “unintended 
consequences of the current rules” and wanted CMS to “restore fair-
ness” to the law.56  
 
D. Penalties under Stark 
If the penalties under Stark were inconsequential, the strict liabil-
ity aspect of the law would not be so significant.  As it is, however, 
Stark can result in “ruinous financial liability.”57  Penalties include 
denial of payment for claims submitted as a result of an unlawful rela-
tionship,58 mandated refunds of amounts collected in violation of 
Stark,59 and fines assessed by the OIG.60  The total penalty amounts in 
Stark cases are often in the millions of dollars.61  
  
 53 See Steven D. Wales, The Stark Law: Boon or Boondoggle?  An Analysis 
of the Prohibition on Physician Self-Referrals, 27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 22-24 
(2003) (citing commentators’ descriptions of Stark as “confusing,” “complicated,” 
“over-reaching, too complex and intrusive,” “antiquated,” among many others). 
 54 WHITE PAPER, supra note 38, at 6. 
 55 AHA Letter, supra note 8, at 1. 
 56 Id. at 4. 
 57 Ankur J. Goel & Daniel H. Melvin, New CMS Self-Disclosure Protocol 
Fundamentally Changes the Landscape For Stark Law Compliance and Enforcement, 
14 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) 862 (2010). 
 58 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(1) (2006); 42 C.F.R. § 411.353(b) (2010). 
 59 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(2); 42 C.F.R. § 411.353(d). 
 60 Civil Monetary Penalties, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7a (2011); 42 C.F.R. § 
1003.102(b) (2010).  A CMP is an administrative remedy that gives providers very 
limited rights to review in the courts. 
 61 See, e.g., Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Covenant Medical Center to Pay 
U.S. $4.5 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations (Aug. 25, 2009), available 
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If providers exhibit intent to violate Stark, they can be liable for 
additional fines through the application of civil monetary penalties 
(CMPs).  HHS has the authority to impose CMPs up to $15,000 per 
claim, depending on the specifics of the offense, and up to $100,000 
per arrangement which the physician or entity knew or should have 
known had the principal purpose of assuring referrals which, if made 
directly, would violate the Stark Law.62  Providers may also be per-
manently excluded from participation in federal health-care programs, 
meaning that no goods or services furnished by an excluded provider 
are reimbursable under federal health-care programs.  Furthermore, 
other providers may not employ or contract with excluded providers.63 
The ACA extended CMPs to any person who “knows of an overpay-
ment . . . [and] does not report and return the overpayment . . . .” 64 
A Stark violation can also trigger the application of the False 
Claims Act (FCA).  The FCA is not specifically a health-care statute; 
instead, it prohibits the knowing submission of “false or fraudulent” 
claims for payment to the federal government.65  Violations of the 
FCA are punishable by up to treble damages and an $11,000 per-claim 
penalty.66  Prior to the 2009 passage of the Fraud Enforcement and 
Recovery Act (FERA), a Stark violation would trigger the FCA if a 
provider submitted claims for payment that had arisen out of an illegal 
financial relationship under Stark.  The FCA stated that any person 
who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false 
record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay 
or transmit money or property to the [g]overnment” had violated the 
  
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/August/09-civ-849.html; Press Release, Dept. 
of Justice, Northside Hospital and Doctors’ Groups Pay $6.37 Million to U.S. to 
Settle False Claims Act Suit (Oct. 20, 2006), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/gan/press/2006/10-20-06b.pdf; Press Release, Dept. of 
Justice, St. Joseph Medical Center in Maryland to Pay U.S. $22 Million to Resolve 
False Claims Act Allegations (Nov. 9, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/November/10-civ-1271.html. 
 62 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(g)(3)-(4) (2011). 
 63 Publication of the OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on the Effect of Exclu-
sion from Participation in Federal Health Care Programs, 64 Fed. Reg. 52,791, 52,792 
(Sept. 30, 1999). 
 64 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 
6402(d)(2)(A)(iii), 124 Stat. 119, 758 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-
7a(a)). 
 65 False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(1)(A)-(G) (Supp. III 2010). 
 66 Id. § 3729(a)(1).  The original $10,000 per claim penalty was adjusted 
upward for inflation.  28 C.F.R. §§ 85.3, (a)(9) (2008).   
2012] CATCHING FLIES WITH VINEGAR 183 
FCA.67  Providers had to engage in an affirmative act intended to 
avoid or conceal the obligation to repay.68 
With the passage of the FERA, providers became liable not only 
for affirmative acts that conceal overpayments, but also for the failure 
to repay an identified overpayment.69  No attempt to conceal is re-
quired.  Simply avoiding the obligation to repay is enough to trigger 
the FCA.  Anyone who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made 
or used, a false record or statement material to an obligation to pay or 
transmit money or property to the Government, or knowingly conceals 
or knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay 
or transmit money or property to the Government . . .” has violated the 
FCA.70 
In addition to creating an affirmative obligation for providers to 
“report and return” overpayments, the ACA made another significant 
change to the FCA.  It established a sixty-day window within which 
an “identified” overpayment must be reported and returned to the 
government.71  The statute starts tolling on either the day that the 
claim is submitted or the day that a corresponding cost report is due, 
whichever is later.72  Prior to the ACA, HHS regulations had used 
sixty days as the definition of a “prompt refund” required for proper 
handling of incorrect collections.73  The ACA simply applied that time 
limit to the FCA. 
 
E. Qui Tam Actions and the Stark Law 
The FCA rewards whistleblowers who report suspected violations 
of the FCA.  A whistleblower can file suit as a qui tam relator.74  If the 
government decides to intervene in the qui tam action and ultimately 
reaches a cash settlement or prevails in court, the qui tam relator can 
receive up to one-fourth of the government’s recovery as a reward for 
  
 67 False Claims Act 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) (2006). 
 68 Id. 
 69 False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (Supp. III 2010). 
 70 Id.; see generally id. § 3729(b)(1) (stating that “knowingly” means that a 
person either has “actual knowledge of the information,” “acts in deliberate ignorance 
of the truth…of the information,” or “acts in reckless disregard of the truth…of the 
information,” regardless of a lack of specific intent to defraud). 
 71 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 
6402(a), 124 Stat. 119, 755 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k(d)(2)). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Timing and Methods of Handling, 42 C.F.R. § 489.41 (2010). 
 74 Under the FCA, a qui tam relator is a private individual who brings an 
allegation of fraud or abuse to the government.  False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 
3730(b)(1) (2006). 
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alerting the government to the false claims.75  Qui tam relators there-
fore have every incentive to push for prosecution of even the most 
minor Stark violation.  In addition, relators are unaffected by the 
counterbalancing policy concerns that normally restrain prosecutors in 
situations where the government has not truly been harmed by an in-
advertent violation.76   
Most Stark-related legal action arises in the form of suits by qui 
tam relators rather than prosecutors.77  Between 1986 and 2008, 62 
percent of FCA cases were initiated and filed by qui tam relators.78  
These relators have no incentive to take a provider’s record of overall 
compliance with Medicare into consideration, and every incentive to 
seek the maximum penalty.  The prominent role of qui tam relators in 
health-care fraud cases has led to a situation where many Stark en-
forcement actions fail to assess the seriousness of an offense or priori-
tize prosecutorial resources.79  
 The linkage between Stark and the FCA provides most of the 
teeth for Stark enforcement.  Consider our example involving Dr. 
House and his unsigned agreement.  Assume the unsigned agreement 
was not discovered for several years after the omission occurred.  All 
claims that Dr. House or the hospital made to government payers, 
such as Medicare, for services provided by either party over the year 
in which the agreement was in place are overpayments.  This is true 
regardless of whether or not the patients needed the services or the 
services were provided appropriately.  The government’s position is 
that the contract between the doctor and the hospital was improper.  
As a result, all services provided under that contract were improperly 
  
 75 Id. § 3730(d)(1)-(2). 
 76 See Joan H. Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc: Para-
digms of Government Harm Under the Civil False Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REV. 121, 
203 (2001) (discussing concerns that prosecutorial discretion is undermined when the 
DOJ is forced to allocate significant resources to reviewing numerous qui tam fil-
ings); cf. Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral Hazard Problem with Privatization of 
Public Enforcement: The Case of Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
281, 297-98 (2007) (recognizing prosecutorial discretion is minimized by qui tam 
filings, though the government may have economic incentive to allow them to pro-
ceed to litigation). 
 77 WHITE PAPER, supra note 38, at 3. 
 78 Robert T. Rhoad & Matthew F. Fornataro, A Gathering Storm:  The New 
False Claims Act Amendments and Their Impact on Healthcare Fraud Enforcement, 
21 HEALTH LAWYER 14, 16 (Aug. 2009) (discussing the use of False Claims Act qui 
tam cases in healthcare fraud enforcement). 
 79 See Lower & Stone, supra note 52, at 122-25; see also Matthew, supra 
note 76, at 297-98 (discussing FCA qui tam enforcement, although the author’s prem-
ise is likely applicable to the increased role of qui tam relators in health care fraud 
generally). 
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provided.  Therefore, any money the government paid on any of the 
claims constitutes an overpayment that must be repaid.  Even if the 
hospital was not aware of the oversight, the strict liability aspect of 
Stark means that the hospital and Dr. House are now liable for repay-
ment of all the claims made for care of patients that Dr. House admit-
ted to the hospital or otherwise referred there for services.   
In addition, the hospital and Dr. House are liable for CMPs under 
the FCA if they become aware of the overpayments and do not repay 
them within sixty days.  These penalties generally consist of a per-
claim penalty of $11,000 plus three times the amount of the overpay-
ment (in other words, the total value of referrals made in the case of a 
Stark violation).80  Depending on how many referrals Dr. House has 
sent to the hospital during the applicable time period, the amount of 
the potential penalties could add up to millions of dollars—all for a 
lapsed agreement with no harm to the government or patients.     
It is important to note that, due to the strict liability nature of 
Stark, most of the penalties that could be assessed against a provider 
in a situation such as the one involving Dr. House would be identical 
to the penalties in a situation in which Dr. House and the hospital en-
tered into a covert scheme to pay Dr. House kickbacks for referring 
patients to the hospital (with the exception of penalties requiring ac-
tual or constructive knowledge).  The obligation to return overpay-
ments resulting from a relationship that violated Stark would be the 
same in both situations.  If the government took the position that the 
providers had “identified” the overpayments and failed to return them, 
the additional penalties possible under the CMP statute and FCA pen-
alties for failure to return those when discovered would also be the 
same.81  To add to Dr. House and the hospital’s woes, a disgruntled 
clerk who learns of Dr. House’s failure to sign the agreement can also 
pursue a qui tam action against Dr. House and the hospital.  
The stringent penalties possible under Stark are exacerbated by 
the possibility that qui tam relators can use the facts revealed by pro-
viders in self-disclosures to the government as the basis for their qui 
tam action.  Providers may actually be giving qui tam relators ammu-
nition when the providers voluntarily step forward to acknowledge 
violations of the law that would have otherwise been unknown to the 
relators or the government.  The FCA generally bars private parties 
from bringing qui tam suits based on the public disclosure that is part 
  
 80 False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (Supp. III 2010). 
 81 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(4) (2006).  A Stark CMP of up to $100,000 per 
arrangement may be assessed against a physician or entity for participation in an 
“arrangement or scheme” which the party knows or should know has the principle 
purpose of securing referrals.  Id. 
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of a criminal, civil or administration hearing; a congressional, admin-
istrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or 
investigation; or from the news media.82   
Some courts have taken the position that voluntary disclosures 
made to the government on a party’s own initiative rather than in re-
sponse to a government inquiry do not constitute a “public disclo-
sure.”  For example, in United States ex. rel. Liotine v. CDW Gov’t 
Inc., the court determined that the plaintiff’s qui tam allegation was 
not “publically disclosed” by the defendant’s voluntary disclosure of 
similar information to the government, when that information was 
uncovered by the defendant’s internal audit and not as a result of an 
audit “‘undertaken by authorized government officials with official 
purposes.’”83   
Other courts have held that voluntary disclosure does bar an FCA 
qui tam action.  For example, a district court in United States ex rel. 
Cosens v. Yale-New Haven Hospital held that statements to Medicare 
investigators were a “public disclosure.”84  Although this question is 
beyond the scope of this Article, these cases suffice to illustrate the 
point that providers have reason to be concerned that their voluntary 
disclosures may subsequently be used against them by qui tam plain-
tiffs.   
 
F. “Technical” v. “Substantive” Stark Issues 
As noted earlier, Rep. Stark’s purpose in proposing this law was 
to target intentional activity without saddling administrative agencies 
with the difficulties of proving intent.  While it makes sense to relax 
the standard of proof in order to assure that providers cannot easily 
avoid the purpose of the statute, if the statute is blindly applied with-
out any consideration for proportionality between the violation and 
punishment, the public policy rationale behind the statute may be un-
dermined.  This problem is especially acute in situations of so-called 
“technical” violations of Stark.  Providers contend that these “techni-
cal” violations should be treated differently from substantive viola-
  
 82 False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006). 
 83 United States ex rel. Liotine v. CDW Gov’t Inc., No. 05-33-DRH, 2009 
WL 3156704, at *7 (S.D.Ill. Sept. 29, 2009) (quoting United States ex rel. Mathews v. 
Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 862 (7th Cir. 1999); see also United States ex rel. 
Rost v. Pfizer, Inc., 507 F.3d 720, 730 (1st Cir. 2007) (rejecting the notion that volun-
tary disclosure to the government can constitute a public disclosure). 
 84 United States ex rel. Cosens v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 2d 
319, 327 (D. Conn. 2002). 
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tions, both in terms of the process the government uses to resolve 
overpayment issues and the penalties assessed.   
Most issues that arise under Stark are matters relating to compli-
ance with the specific requirements for meeting the language of vari-
ous exceptions rather than any more substantive problem. Strict en-
forcement of technical violations with application of the same penal-
ties as are used for more serious issues produces potentially unjust 
penalties.  Kevin McAnaney, Chief of the OIG’s Industry Guidance 
Branch from its creation in 1997 until May 2003, has stated that most 
of the issues under Stark relate to these technical violations rather than 
anything more substantive.  He has written that “[t]he Stark statute is 
so potentially unfair—the rules have gotten increasingly more techni-
cal and penalties are draconian—and even though CMS has never 
gone after hospitals, the potential liability is a Damocles sword over 
them.”85  McAnaney’s sentiments were echoed in the AHLA White 
Paper on the Stark Law, which was based on two Convener Sessions 
held in April and June 2009.86  The participants in the sessions in-
cluded in-house counsel to health-care providers, academics, attorneys 
in firms representing providers and qui tam relators, and former gov-
ernment attorneys.  Attorneys currently serving the government ob-
served but did not participate in the sessions.  The AHLA White Paper 
concluded that “innocent or highly technical violations [of the Stark 
law] can result in ruinous liability,” and “technical violations that 
cause no harm to the federal program can trigger huge penalties.”87 
Two practitioners recently noted that, because of the Stark law, 
the health-care industry is in a particularly difficult situation when 
simple mistakes are made:   
 
Such mistakes occur in every corner of every industry 
of a modern, fast-paced economy.  But in every other 
industry, the law provides the parties with options to 
resolve compliance problems uncovered from their in-
ternal reviews—to execute contract amendments or 
new contracts with retroactive effective dates, to enter 
into repayment arrangements, or to reform their con-
tracts based on the doctrines of mutual mistake or 
  
 85 OIG ‘Open Letter’ to Industry Cites Kickbacks in Self-Disclosure Proto-
col, supra note 16; see also AHA Letter, supra note 8, at 3 (Stark’s increased com-
plexities make it difficult for compliance by even the best intentioned providers, 
leaving open the possibility of disproportionately large liability in relation to the 
conduct giving rise to the violation). 
 86 WHITE PAPER, supra note 38, at 1. 
 87 Id. at 3, 6. 
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course of dealing.  If they uncover minor compliance 
violations, they have a means of fixing them and put-
ting them to rest.  This is not the case for healthcare 
providers trapped by the highly technical requirements 
of the Stark law.88 
 
 Social science research supports the notion that if providers believe 
the law punishes minor procedural failings in the same way as it pun-
ishes intentional attempts to improperly influence referral patterns, the 
providers will be less likely to comply with the law.  Professor Paul 
Robinson has written about the importance of the government having 
“moral credibility” when attempting to convince people to obey the 
law.89  He argues that simply enacting a statute is not enough to per-
suade individuals and companies to obey the law.  People must see the 
law as having moral credibility.  Robinson goes on to define “moral 
credibility” as the law’s reputation for punishing those who deserve it, 
under rules perceived as just.  Furthermore, he says, the law must pro-
tect from punishment those who do not deserve punishment and as-
sure that any punishment levied is in the amount deserved—“no more 
and no less.”90  In his book, Why People Obey the Law, sociologist 
Tom Tyler states, in a similar vein, that “[i]t is interesting that people 
appear to connect the obligations of authorities to issues of fair proce-
dure, not to outcomes.  It is being unfairly treated that disrupts the 
relationship of legitimacy to compliance, not receiving poor out-
comes.”91 
In 2007, CMS seemed on the verge of recognizing that some 
types of Stark violations are less serious than others.  CMS proposed 
regulations that would create new criteria by which providers could 
satisfy Stark exceptions in situations where the failure to satisfy the 
exception was merely “procedural.”92   
 
The alternative method for compliance with the physi-
cian self-referral prohibition would provide that, if an 
arrangement does not meet all of the existing pre-
  
 88 Lower & Stone, supra note 52, at 118 (discussing the CMS position that 
state law contract doctrines are not available to remedy technical violations of Stark, 
citing 73 Fed. Reg. 48434, 48703 (Aug. 19, 2008)).   
 89 See generally Paul H. Robinson, Moral Credibility and Crime: Why Peo-
ple Obey the Law, CURRENT, June 1995, at 10. 
 90 Id. at 12. 
 91 TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 172 (2006). 
 92 Medicare Program; Proposed Revisions to Payment Policies Under the 
Physician Fee Schedule, and Other Part B Payment Policies for CY 2008, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 38,122, 38,185 (proposed July 12, 2007). 
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scribed criteria of an exception, the arrangement nev-
ertheless would meet the exception if: (1) The facts 
and circumstances of the arrangement are self-
disclosed by the parties to us; (2) we determine that 
the arrangement satisfied all but the prescribed proce-
dural or “form” requirements of the exception at the 
time of the referral for DHS at issue and at the time of 
the claim for such DHS; (3) the failure to meet all the 
prescribed criteria of the exception was inadvertent; 
(4) the referral for DHS and the claim for DHS were 
not made with knowledge that one or more of the pre-
scribed criteria of the exception were not met (consis-
tent with other exceptions, we would apply the same 
knowledge standard as that applicable under the False 
Claims Act); (5) the parties have brought (or will bring 
as soon as possible) the arrangement into complete 
compliance with the prescribed criteria of the excep-
tion or have terminated (or will terminate as soon as 
possible) the financial relationship between or among 
them; (6) the arrangement did not pose a risk of pro-
gram or patient abuse; (7) no more than a set amount 
of time had passed since the time of the original non-
compliance with the prescribed criteria; and (8) the ar-
rangement at issue is not the subject of an ongoing 
Federal investigation or other proceeding (including, 
but not limited to, an enforcement matter.93  
 
CMS specified that the alternative method was not intended to be 
used in situations where there was a question of whether the compen-
sation was at “fair market value, not related to volume or value of 
referrals, or set in advance.”94  This sort of exception was to be re-
served for procedural issues such as a missing signature or an expired 
employment agreement still being followed by the parties.95    
CMS received thousands of comments about the proposed regula-
tion.  While most of the comments applauded CMS’s goal of setting 
aside non-substantive violations, many were skeptical of the approach.  
Commenters expressed concern about the amount of discretion CMS 
  
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id.  Consideration of an alternative method of Stark compliance for these 
types of technical violations has been supported by a number of providers, their coun-
sel, and interest groups.  See infra Part IV.D. 
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would have to assess a provider’s motivation.96  CMS specified that it 
would retain sole discretion to determine whether the relationship met 
the terms of the exception.  Parties had no right to an administrative or 
judicial review of this determination.97  
Rather than decrease the scope of the agency’s discretion in re-
sponse to these concerns, CMS chose instead to greatly narrow the 
scope of the exception.  The final version was limited to situations in 
which providers comply with all Stark requirements other than the 
signature requirement, and only for very limited time periods.98  The 
final rule eliminated most of the eight criteria originally proposed, 
including the requirements that parties self-disclose a noncompliant 
relationship, and that CMS determine the relationship satisfactory in 
all areas but the procedural criteria.  Instead, CMS chose to allow pro-
viders to take advantage of this alternative policy for compliance only 
when the relationship in question fulfills all criteria of an exception 
except for the signature requirement.99 
Unfortunately, those limitations are so narrow as to make the ex-
ception practically irrelevant for most providers.  The real problem for 
a provider is a lapsed agreement or a missing signature that goes un-
discovered for years, potentially racking up huge CMP and FCA pen-
alties.  Some have argued for a new Stark exception for procedural 
violations as a means of mitigating Stark’s harshness in this regard,100 
but CMS does not seem to be considering any such exception.   
 
G. CMS’s Authority to Settle Cases 
Prior to the enactment of the ACA, CMS had little or no authority 
to compromise or waive any claims liability under Stark or other stat-
utes.101  Thus, “prosecutorial discretion” was simply not available.  
OIG, by contrast, did not have this limitation.  When OIG announced 
that it would no longer take Stark-only disclosures so that it could 
  
 96 Alternative Method for Compliance with Signature Requirements in Cer-
tain Exceptions, 73 Fed. Reg. 48,705 (Aug. 19, 2008) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 
411.353(g)). 
 97 Medicare Program; Proposed Revisions to Payment Policies under the 
Physician Fee Schedule, and Other Part B Payment Policies for CY 2008, 72 Fed. 
Reg. at 38,185. 
 98 Alternative Method for Compliance with Signature Requirements in Cer-
tain Exceptions, 73 Fed. Reg. at 48,706. 
 99 Id. 
 100 See Lower & Stone, supra note 52 (proposing a Technical Deficiency 
Exception to Stark; WHITE PAPER, supra note 38, at 15 (suggesting a Technical Viola-
tion Exception). 
 101 Prior to PPACA, 42 C.F.R. § 405.376 did not include Stark claims among 
those that could be compromised by CMS.  42 C.F.R. § 405.376(d) (2010). 
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focus on criminal activity under other statutes, providers lost their best 
avenue for negotiating settlements.  However, as noted above, this 
situation was remedied by the ACA’s explicit grant of authority to 
CMS to compromise on penalty amounts in Stark cases,102 creating 
significant opportunities for improving the administration of the Stark 
Law, as will be discussed below.103    
 
II. THE SELF-DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL  
A. Providers’ Legal Obligation to Self-Disclose  
When a provider discovers a Stark violation that has resulted in 
overpayments (as defined by FERA and the FCA), the clock begins 
ticking on the provider’s obligation to report and return the overpay-
ment to the government within sixty days.104  An overpayment re-
tained past the deadline is an “obligation” for purposes of the reverse 
false claims provision of the FCA.105 Self-disclosure under SRDP tolls 
the sixty-day requirement.106  Also, a provider may be eligible for a 
reduction in penalties if the overpayment is self-reported rather than 
discovered by the government in some other manner.107   
A protocol has been in place since 1998 for self-disclosure of is-
sues related to Stark and the Anti-Kickback Statute.108  The OIG Self-
Disclosure Protocol (SDP) is based on a Department of Defense self-
disclosure program from the 1980s.109  The SDP requires that the pro-
vider describe the problem, including the scope and results of its in-
ternal investigation, an assessment of the financial impact on govern-
ment health programs, and an explanation of the likely cause of the 
problem.110  The SDP is administered by the OIG, which has jurisdic-
tion over actions arising under the Anti-Kickback Statute.   
  
 102 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 
6409(b), 124 Stat. 119, 772 (2010) (to be codified at 42. U.S.C. § 1395nn note). 
 103 See infra Part III. 
 104 PPACA § 6402(a), 124 Stat. at 755. 
 105 See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(3) (Supp. III 2010). 
 106 SRDP, supra note 9, at 1. 
 107 Id. 
 108 See Publication of the OIG’s Provider Self- Disclosure Protocol, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 58,399, 58,399 (Oct. 30, 1998) [hereinafter OIG’s Provider Self-Disclosure 
Protocol]. 
 109 See generally INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF DEF., THE DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE PROGRAM (Apr. 1990) [hereinafter DEPARTMENT 
OF DEFENSE VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE PROGRAM], available at 
http://www.dodig.mil/iginformation/archives/vdguidelines.pdf.  
 110 Id. at 6, 12. 
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Originally, providers were expected to report Stark violations us-
ing the OIG SDP.  However, in 2009, due to the large volume of dis-
closures it was receiving and its limited resources to process the dis-
closures, the OIG decided to focus on the more serious Anti-Kickback 
Statute situations and stop accepting disclosures of Stark-only viola-
tions.111  As a result, providers complained about the lack of good 
options for Stark-only self-disclosures.  Congress responded with the 
ACA provision requiring CMS to develop a protocol.112  
 
B. Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol Basics 
The SRDP provides that the disclosure must identify the disclos-
ing provider113 and describe the issue being disclosed, including the 
type of transaction or conduct giving rise to the issue; entities and/or 
individuals implicated and an explanation of their roles; financial rela-
tionship(s) involved, including specific periods during which the pro-
vider may have been out of compliance; any applicable date(s) by 
which the conduct was cured; and any type of designated health serv-
ice claims involved.114  
The disclosure must also include a complete legal analysis as to 
why the disclosing party believes a violation of the Stark law may 
have occurred; the application of Stark to the conduct, including any 
exceptions that may apply to the conduct; a description of the poten-
tial causes of the incident;115 the circumstances surrounding the dis-
covery of the matter and measures taken to address the issue and pre-
vent future abuses;116 and a statement concerning any history of simi-
lar conduct, or any prior criminal, civil and regulatory enforcement 
actions against the disclosing provider.117   
The provider must describe the existence and adequacy of a pre-
existing compliance program and all actions taken to prevent a recur-
rence of the incident or practice, including any measures taken to re-
structure the noncompliant relationship or arrangement.118  The pro-
  
 111 Open Letter from Daniel R. Levinson, Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Health & 
Human Serv’s, to Health Care Providers, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERV’S (Mar. 24, 2009), 
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/openletters/OpenLetter3-24-09.pdf. 
 112 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6409, 
124 Stat. 119, 772-73 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn note). 
 113 SRDP, supra note 9, at 3. 
 114 Id. at 4. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
2012] CATCHING FLIES WITH VINEGAR 193 
vider must also describe any other federal health-care program inves-
tigations to which the provider is currently subject, including any 
other disclosures made by the provider to other government entities.119    
The provider must also set out a full financial analysis, including 
a total amount, itemized by year, that is actually or potentially owed, 
back to the date of the initial noncompliance (or “look-back pe-
riod”),120 along with an explanation of the methodology used to calcu-
late the amount.121  The SRDP requires that the provider include in the 
financial analysis the total amount of remuneration the physician(s) 
received as a result of an actual or potential violation, based on the 
applicable “look-back period”.122  Finally, the provider must include a 
certification of the truthfulness of the information, based on a good 
faith effort to resolve the disclosed potential liabilities under Stark.123   
After receiving the disclosure, CMS verifies the facts asserted in 
the disclosure.124  The extent of CMS’s verification effort depends, in 
large part, upon the quality and thoroughness of the submission re-
ceived.125  Matters uncovered during the verification process, which 
are outside the scope of the matter disclosed to CMS, may be treated 
as new matters outside the scope of the SRDP and thus proper sub-
jects for governmental investigation and possible prosecution.126   
 Generally, CMS will not request information subject to the attor-
ney-client privilege.127  If there are documents that may be covered by 
the attorney work-product doctrine, but which CMS believes are criti-
cal to resolving the disclosure, CMS says it is prepared to work with 
the disclosing party’s counsel to gain access to the underlying infor-
mation without waiving privilege.128   
Before any repayment is made, the disclosing party must ac-
knowledge in writing that CMS’s acceptance of the payment is not an 
agreement as to the amount of losses suffered by the government, and 
“does not relieve the disclosing party of any criminal, civil, or civil 
monetary penalty, nor does it offer a defense to any further adminis-
trative, civil, or criminal actions against the disclosing party.”129   
  
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 5. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 5-6. 
 125 Id. at 5. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 6. 
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The disclosing party must exhibit good faith and full cooperation 
with CMS during the disclosure process.130  This cooperation includes 
the provision of documents and materials without CMS having to 
resort to “compulsory methods.”131  CMS will consider a lack of 
good-faith cooperation on the part of the provider when it determines 
the appropriate resolution of the matter.132  The intentional submission 
of false information, or the intentional omission of relevant informa-
tion, will be referred to the DOJ or other appropriate federal agencies 
and may result in additional criminal and/or civil sanctions and exclu-
sion from participation in federal health-care programs.133 
CMS is not bound by any conclusions made by the disclosing 
party under the SRDP.134  Furthermore, it is not obligated to resolve 
the matter disclosed in any particular manner and has no obligation to 
reduce any amounts owed.135  A disclosing provider has no right of 
appeal for matters resolved through a settlement agreement.136  If a 
provider’s SRDP submission is denied acceptance, is removed, or 
withdrawn, the provider may appeal any overpayment demand let-
ter.137  However, CMS reserves the right to reopen any Medicare cost 
reports filed since the initial disclosure of Stark violations.138 
 
C. Revisions of the SRDP  
Since the initial release of the SRDP, CMS has received informal 
comments from providers and attorneys regarding unclear provisions.  
Agency representatives have informally commented that they learned 
about some items that needed clarification after reviewing the first 
SRDP submissions.139  In May 2011, CMS released the latest version 
of the SRDP.  This version specified that all physician fees related to a 
noncompliant arrangement needed to be calculated as part of the dis-
closing provider’s financial analysis.140  More recently, Lewis Morris, 
  
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 2. 
 135 Id. at 2, 6. 
 136 Id. at 2. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Joe Carlson, Few Details Emerge on CMS Self-Disclosure Process, 
MODERN HEALTHCARE (June 29, 2011), 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20110629/NEWS/306299963/ (“We’re in a 
learning process.” (quoting Troy Barsky, Director, CMS Technical Payment Policy 
Division, speaking at the 2011 AHLA annual meeting)). 
 140 SRDP, supra note 9, at 5. 
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Chief Counsel at OIG, announced that the agency is preparing to re-
lease additional guidance regarding self-disclosure, although it has not 
announced specifically what that guidance will cover.141  However, 
there is no indication that CMS is considering the type of significant 
changes to the SRDP proposed in this Article. 
 
D.  Results of the SRDP to Date 
The ACA included a provision requiring CMS to report to Con-
gress regarding disclosures by March 2012.142  The report will include 
the number of health-care providers or suppliers making disclosures, 
the dollar amounts collected, and the types of violations reported.143  
CMS representatives have described some of the disclosures to date in 
very general terms, but have not issued any summaries in writing.144  
OIG’s website provides information about its settlements, such as the 
general nature of the issue and the amount of the settlement.145  Pre-
sumably, CMS’s upcoming report to Congress will include similar 
information. 
One hospital has been willing to publicly discuss the results of its 
self-disclosure to CMS.  The settlement occurred prior to the release 
of the revised SRDP, but it at least provides some guidance as to how 
CMS conducts negotiations in these matters and on what terms it will 
settle.146  That case involved Saints Medical Center in Lowell, Massa-
chusetts.  The settlement was for $579,000, an amount lower than the 
hospital’s attorneys’ lowest estimate of potential obligation.147  Attor-
neys for the hospital said that they had not been given the opportunity 
  
 141 Gregg Blesch, Lawyer Warns on Overpayment Disclosures, MODERN 
HEALTHCARE (June 27, 2011), 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20110627/NEWS/306279945/.  Mr. Morris 
was co-addressing a meeting of in-house counsel assembled for the American Health 
Lawyers Association annual meeting with Robert Homchick, partner, Davis Wright 
Tremaine LLP. 
 142 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. no. 111–148, § 
6409(c), 124 Stat. 119, 773 (2010) (to be codified 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn note). 
 143 Id. 
 144 Kass et al., supra note 12, at 29:45 (discussing the Saints Medical Center 
settlement). 
 145 Selected Provider Self-disclosure Protocol Settlements, OFF. OF THE 
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV’S, 
http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/enforcement/cmp/self_disclosure.asp (last visited July 
31, 2011). 
 146 See Press Release, Saints Medical Center, Saints Medical Center Resolves 
Medicare Billing Compliance Issue (Feb. 10, 2011) [hereinafter Saints Press Release], 
available at http://www.saintsmedicalcenter.com/news/CMS/. 
 147 Id. 
196 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 22:169] 
to negotiate the settlement at all; nonetheless, they were pleased with 
the amount in light of potential penalties.148   
 
III. THE HONEY AND THE VINEGAR: INCENTIVES AND 
DISINCENTIVES TO DISCLOSURE IN THE SRDP 
A. Importance of Incentives in a Decision to Disclose 
CMS’s position on the SRDP seems to be that since the law re-
quires self-disclosure, the agency does not need the “honey” of posi-
tive incentives to self-disclose.149  However, the dearth of disclosures 
to date, compared to the multitude of potential issues requiring disclo-
sure,150 indicates that a legal requirement to disclose is simply not 
enough to make providers do the right thing.  Most providers will not 
state for the record whether and why they have decided not to disclose 
issues which they are legally required to disclose.  Some attorneys 
report that clients are waiting to see how CMS administers the proto-
col before they decide whether to use it.151  In other cases, providers 
simply do not believe that the benefits of disclosure outweigh the 
risks.  Attorneys report that their clients “tend to lean toward crossing 
their fingers and hoping no one finds out rather than opening their 
books to the government and inviting a certain financial consequence 
in exchange for possible leniency.”152   
We can gain some insight into the reasoning of these providers by 
analyzing data and comments by health-care attorneys responding to a 
2008 AHLA survey on the OIG self-disclosure protocol.153  Although 
the survey deals with a different protocol and predates the ACA’s 
  
 148 Kass et al., supra note 12, at 23:35 (discussing disclosure by Saints’ attor-
ney Christine Savage). 
 149 Video News: Live@AHLA 2011 Interview with OIG Chief Counsel Lewis 
Morris, MODERN HEALTHCARE (June 27, 2011, 5:00 PM), 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20110627/VIDEO/306279890.  Mr. Morris 
comments on PPACA, specifying that the law provides an “affirmative statutory 
obligation to repay money that does not belong to the provider.”  Id. 
 150 See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. 
 151 Lauer & Roth, supra note 11; see Jason Christ et al., CMS Opens its Doors 
by Creating the Stark Voluntary Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol—But Enter at Your 
Own Risk, 19 HEALTH LAW REP. (BNA) 1400 (2010) (concluding that given uncer-
tainty regarding a number of SRDP provisions, some providers may elect to wait 
before evaluating the merits of the protocol until after CMS responds to initial disclo-
sures in its March 2012 report to Congress). 
 152 Blesch, supra note 141 (discussing comments by Robert Homchick). 
 153 2007-08 Voluntary Disclosure Survey, ZOOMERANG.COM [hereinafter 
Voluntary Disclosure Survey], 
http://www.zoomerang.com/Shared/SharedResultsSurveyResultsPage.aspx?ID=L235
XLG2T5DX (last visited Oct. 29, 2011) (complete survey results). 
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requirement to self-disclose violations, it offers some helpful glimpses 
into the advantages and disadvantages of self-disclosure from the pro-
vider’s perspective.   
The survey asked AHLA members to describe their experience 
with the then-new OIG SDP.154  One hundred ninety-five attorneys 
responded.  Most of the disclosures related to billing or coding errors, 
but 28 percent related to either Anti-Kickback or Stark disclosures.155  
In approximately 46 percent of the cases in which respondents self-
disclosed, the government settled for a simple repayment of the over-
payment in question.156  In 18 percent, the government negotiated an 
amount to be repaid plus simple interest, while 22 percent negotiated 
settlements but were not required to pay interest.157  Six percent in-
volved some type of regulatory penalty, while 7 percent resulted in a 
civil monetary penalty or other administrative monetary sanction for 
individuals or the company.158  In 8 percent of the cases, there was an 
FCA settlement with a multiplier of the overpayment.159  Twelve per-
cent of the cases resulted in a corporate integrity agreement.160   
The survey did not ask what factors were most important in per-
suading the provider to self-disclose.  However, the open-ended re-
sponse section of the survey provided a platform for candid comments 
on the advantages and disadvantages of self-disclosure from the pro-
vider’s point of view.  For example, one attorney said, “[m]y clients 
have consistently chosen not to make voluntary disclosures.”161  An-
other stated that, “[i]n the few instances where voluntary disclosure 
was discussed with the client, the decision was made not to voluntar-
ily disclose because the medical practice did not have all of its com-
pliance ducks in a row and was worried about what else the govern-
ment might uncover if they came onsite to investigate.”162  One re-
spondent cautioned:  
 
The FI’s (fiscal intermediary’s) fraud unit and the OIG 
eventually got involved and demonstrated a real inabil-
ity to understand the provider’s side of the issue.  
  
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. (follow “View 65 Responses” hyperlink to Response 3 for Question 
11). 
 162 Id. (follow “View 65 Responses” hyperlink to Response 6 for Question 
11). 
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Eventually, the AUSA [Associate U.S. Attorney] and 
OIG forced an interest payment that was absolutely in-
correct and unjust, on top of a two times False Claims 
Act settlement.  The entire experience removed any il-
lusion that the federal government is interested in fair-
ness.163 
 
Some of the providers reported positive experiences with self-
disclosure.  “The process worked very well for us.  The OIG rep 
worked with us for a fair resolution and noted our cooperative nature 
and self-disclosure.  She accepted our proposed exposure and waived 
any interest or fines.”164  Other commenters echoed that sentiment,165 
stating that the attorney found the process “fair and balanced, unlike 
the early reports of overkill in the last decade of the 20th century.  If 
credible, experienced resources are used and the disclosure is profes-
sionally prepared and handled, the result is often satisfactory for both 
provider and enforcer.”166   
 
B. Incentives to Disclosure under the SRDP 
Providers clearly weigh the honey and vinegar of self-disclosure 
when deciding whether to proceed.  Therefore, one must identify the 
reasons providers would choose to disclose or not.  The most obvious 
reason to disclose a Stark violation is that it is required by the ACA 
and other statutes.167  If the requirement alone were enough to moti-
vate providers, CMS would have far more disclosures than the sev-
enty or so it has received to date.  This Article’s main thesis is that 
  
 163 Id. (follow “View 65 Responses” hyperlink to Response 42 for Question 
11). 
 164 Id. (follow “View 65 Responses” hyperlink to Response 7 for Question 
11). 
 165 Id. (follow “View 65 Responses” hyperlink to Response 41 for Question 
11). 
 166 Id. (follow “View 65 Responses” hyperlink to Response 53 for Question 
11). 
 167 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 
6402(a), 124 Stat. 119, 755 (2010) (to be codified 42 U.S.C. § 1330a-7k(d)(1)); see 
also 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(2) (2006) (“If a person collects any amounts . . .  billed in 
violation of [Stark] . . . , the person shall be liable to the individual for, and shall 
refund on a timely basis . . . amounts [] collected.”); 42 C.F.R. § 411.353(d) (2010) 
(an entity collecting payments for services provided pursuant to a Stark violation 
“must refund [payments] on a timely basis”); False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 
3729(a)(1)(G) (Supp. III 2010) (stating that an entity that “knowingly conceals or 
knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money 
or property to the Government” is subject to False Claim liability). 
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many other factors besides the legal requirement determine the behav-
ior of providers.  If providers were primarily focused on the legal re-
quirement, there would be far fewer compliance issues to disclose in 
the first place, since they would not have allowed any other considera-
tion to trump their need to obey the Stark Law.   
 The SRDP states that while CMS is not obligated to reduce any 
amounts owed as a result of a Stark violation, it will consider doing so 
based on the facts and circumstances of each actual or potential viola-
tion disclosed.168  In the only Stark disclosure to CMS that has been 
made public to date, it does appear that the hospital received a sub-
stantial discount in the settlement from the amount that it might have 
owed in a worst-case scenario.169  As previously mentioned, that case 
involved Saints Hospital in Massachusetts.  The hospital’s attorneys 
stated for the annual audit that liability could be as much as $14 mil-
lion, but the penalty in that case was only $579,000.170  Since CMS 
did not provide any rationale for the final penalty, providers have not 
learned a great deal about what CMS’s position is likely to be in other 
cases.  
 The SRDP further states that if CMS accepts a disclosure into the 
protocol, the disclosure stops the “ticking of the clock” on the pro-
vider’s obligation to repay the overpayment.171  Thus, a provider can 
avoid interest, and potentially some penalties, by making a disclosure.  
CMS, however, is not bound to accept any conclusions by disclosing 
parties and is not obligated to resolve the matter in any particular 
manner.172  
 While there are no criminal penalties for Stark violations, a pro-
vider may nonetheless view creating prosecutorial goodwill as a valu-
able outcome of a Stark self-disclosure.  The SRDP itself notes that a 
prosecutor will not pursue a criminal action against a provider that 
voluntarily discloses noncompliance, especially when the provider has 
cooperated fully, taken any necessary personnel actions, and taken 
action to assure the problem will not recur.173  As Silver and Wisner 
point out:  
 
  
 168 SRDP, supra note 9, at 6. 
 169 See Saints Press Release, supra note 146. 
 170 Kass et al., supra note 12, at 35:00, 34:45 (discussing Saints Medical 
disclosure by Saints’ attorney Christine Savage). 
 171 SRDP, supra note 9, at 1. 
 172 Id. at 2. 
 173 AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS’N, HEALTHCARE COMPLIANCE LEGAL ISSUES 
MANUAL 106 (Harry R. Silver & Cynthia F. Wisner eds., 3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter 
Silver & Wisner]. 
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Additional benefits of self-disclosure include the abil-
ity to more fully frame the issues, complete a thorough 
internal investigation, develop an improved and less-
adversarial relationship with law enforcement officials, 
and demonstrate that the organization is ready and 
willing to act responsibly.  In addition, providers and 
entities that voluntarily disclose may reduce the likeli-
hood of receiving subpoenas or search warrants.174 
 
 Another benefit of self-disclosure is possible avoidance of a cor-
porate integrity agreement (CIA).  In situations where the government 
is concerned about a recurring compliance issue, the agency involved 
often insists upon a CIA as a part of any settlement.  Such agreements 
impose continuing investigative and reporting obligations on provid-
ers, sometimes for a number of years.  The OIG routinely negotiates 
CIAs with health-care providers and other entities as part of the set-
tlement of federal health-care program investigations arising under a 
variety of civil false claims statutes.175  Providers or other entities 
agree to the obligations, and, in exchange, the OIG agrees not to ex-
clude them from participation in Medicare, Medicaid, or other federal 
health-care programs.176  
 According to the OIG, “CIAs have many common elements, but 
each one addresses the specific facts at issue and often attempts to 
accommodate and recognize many of the elements of preexisting vol-
untary compliance programs.”177  The OIG states further that a typical 
CIA lasts five years, and includes the following requirements: 
 
• a compliance officer and compliance committee;  
• written standards and policies;  
• a comprehensive employee training program;  
• annual reviews by an independent review organi-
zation;  
• a hotline or similar confidential disclosure pro-
gram;  
• a program to prevent employment of persons with 
a history of compliance issues;  
  
 174 Id. 
 175 Corporate Integrity Agreements, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERV’S, http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/corporate-integrity-
agreements/index.asp (last visited Aug. 1, 2011). 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id.   
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• reports of overpayments and other compliance is-
sues as they arise; and  
• annual reports to OIG on the status of the entity’s 
compliance program.178 
 
Aside from avoidance of a CIA, a provider might seek to establish 
that it has a good compliance program by self-disclosing a Stark vio-
lation.  The United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) provide 
significant incentives for self-disclosure in the form of reduced crimi-
nal penalties.  The Guidelines give a provider credit for an “effective” 
compliance plan.179  An effective compliance and ethics program is 
one which demonstrates that the organization “exercise[s] due dili-
gence to prevent and detect criminal conduct,” and “otherwise pro-
mote[s] an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and 
a commitment to compliance with the law.”180  The Guidelines specify 
that the program should be “generally effective,” but “failure to pre-
vent or detect . . . [an] offense does not necessarily mean that the pro-
gram is not generally effective.”181  Thus, providers hope that by dis-
closing a compliance issue, they will demonstrate the effectiveness of 
their compliance program, and reap benefits in the event of future 
investigations.     
Self-disclosure also allows a provider to frame the issues and thus 
minimize the impact of any whistleblower action under the FCA.182  
As discussed above in Part I.D, qui tam actions are the major driver of 
Stark enforcement.  Any opportunity to cut off such suits is therefore 
extremely valuable to a provider.  However, as also noted above, that 
ability may be limited if a voluntary disclosure does not foreclose a 
qui tam action.183 
 
C. Disincentives to Disclosure in the SRDP 
There are a number of reasons providers might choose to “roll the 
dice” and risk investigation or prosecution rather than self-disclose 
under the current version of the SRDP.  The most of important are as 
  
 178 Id. 
 179 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2010), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2010_guidelines/Manual_PDF/Chapter_8.pdf.  An 
effective compliance plan may potentially decrease an organization’s point values 
when calculating its Culpability Score.  Id. § 8C2.5(f).  The Culpability Score is then 
used to determine minimum and maximum fine multipliers.  Id. § 8C2.6. 
 180 Id.  § 8B2.1. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Silver & Wisner, supra note 173, at 107. 
 183 See supra Part I.E. 
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follows: (1) the difficulty in identifying an overpayment as required in 
the protocol, (2) CMS’s resistance to settling claims for less than two 
times the overpayment involved, (3) CMS’s failure to distinguish be-
tween procedural and substantive violations, (4) the short amount of 
time within which a disclosure must be made, (5) the difficulty in 
determining whether disclosure should be to CMS or another agency, 
(6) the length of the “look-back” period, (7) the waiver of attorney-
client privilege, (8) the required statement about past conduct, (9) the 
lack of appeal rights, and (10) implications for the provider’s compli-
ance plan.  Each of these issues is set out in detail below. 
 
1. Identification of an Overpayment 
The term “identified” is not defined in the ACA, and so providers 
may not always know whether they have met that threshold require-
ment for the repayment obligation.184  The SRDP does not define the 
term either.  It does require providers to explain to CMS “[t]he cir-
cumstances under which the disclosed matter was discovered and the 
measures taken upon discovery to address the actual or potential vio-
lation and prevent future instances of noncompliance.”185  Further-
more, the SRDP requires that parties identify the “specific time peri-
ods the disclosing party may have been out of compliance (and if ap-
plicable, the dates or a range of dates whereby the conduct was cured) 
. . . .”186   
Former New York Medicaid Inspector General James Sheehan 
once stated that it was his agency’s position that a call to a hospital’s 
complaint hotline triggers the sixty-day period within which the pro-
vider must report an overpayment.187  However, providers point out 
that they receive many unsubstantiated claims that, upon investiga-
tion, prove to be false.  Therefore, they argue, no overpayment has 
been identified until an alleged overpayment has been brought to the 
attention of the correct person within the provider’s organization, in-
vestigated properly, and shown to actually be an overpayment.    
The SRDP states that CMS will take into account the “timeliness 
of the disclosure” in determining the appropriate penalty.188  It also 
cautions that the extent of verification will depend on the quality and 
thoroughness of the submission received.  The disclosure must be 
  
 184 See e.g., Lauer & Roth, supra note 11, at 15-16. 
 185 SRDP, supra note 9, at 4. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Sheehan & Hussar, supra note 19, at 26 (cited in Lauer & Roth, supra note 
11, at 18). 
 188 SRDP, supra note 9, at 6. 
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complete, and no further information should be submitted to augment 
an initial disclosure after it is submitted to CMS.189  Therefore, pro-
viders must choose between submitting the disclosure as soon as pos-
sible and making sure it is complete enough to pass muster with CMS.  
Recently, a CMS representative criticized the disclosures received 
thus far under the SRDP, saying that the main problem is that provid-
ers are not giving CMS enough information when they do make a 
disclosure.190  Providers must walk a difficult line between disclosing 
quickly enough to be timely, but not so quickly as to be deemed in-
complete. 
 
2. CMS’s Position on Financial Settlements 
The congressional mandate in the ACA authorized, but did not re-
quire, CMS to reduce the penalties due under the Stark Law.191  Con-
gress listed three factors that CMS should consider when assessing 
penalties: (1) “[t]he nature and extent of the improper or illegal prac-
tice,” (2) “[t]he timeliness of the self-disclosure,” and (3) “coopera-
tion in providing additional information related to the disclosure.”192  
CMS added additional factors it would consider when it released the 
SRDP: (4) the litigation risk associated with the matter disclosed, (5) 
the amounts owed, (6) the financial position of the disclosing party, 
and (7) other factors as the HHS Secretary deems appropriate.193 
Unlike the OIG, CMS has not publicly announced its willingness 
to decrease Stark penalties below the “face value” of the penalties 
available.  The OIG’s protocol states that, “subject to the facts and 
circumstances of the case, [it] will generally settle SDP matters for  . . 
. a multiplier of the value of the financial benefit conferred by the 
hospital upon the physician(s).”194  Thus, the OIG appears to focus on 
improper financial benefit rather than the maximum penalty available 
under the applicable law. 
  
 189 Id. at 5. 
 190 Carlson, supra note 139. 
 191 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 
6409(b), 124 Stat. 119, 772 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn note). 
 192 § 6409(b), 124 Stat. at 773. 
 193 SRDP, supra note 9, at 1, 6. 
 194 Open Letter from Daniel R. Levinson, Inspector General, Dep’t of Health 
& Human Serv’s, to Health Care Providers (Apr. 24, 2006), 
http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/openletters/Open%20Letter%20to%20Providers%
202006.pdf (emphasis added);  see also Open Letter from Daniel R. Levinson, In-
spector General, Dep’t of Health & Human Serv’s, to Health Care Providers (Apr. 15, 
2008), http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/openletters/OpenLetter4-15-08.pdf (“OIG 
has . . . committed to settling liability . . . generally for . . . a multiplier of the value of 
the financial benefit conferred.”). 
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Prior to the SRDP’s release, the American Hospital Association 
(AHA) urged CMS to consider additional factors such as: 
 
whether the parties’ failure to meet all the prescribed 
criteria of an applicable exception was due to an inno-
cent or unintentional mistake; the corrective action 
taken by the parties; whether the services provided 
were reasonable and medically necessary; whether ac-
cess to a physician’s services was required in an emer-
gency situation; whether the Medicare program suf-
fered any harm beyond the statutory disallowance.195 
 
While CMS’s “litigation risk” criteria might arguably include some of 
the AHA’s suggested factors, CMS declined to openly embrace any of 
the AHA factors.  CMS did not offer any explanation as to why it 
rejected these ideas. 
CMS representatives have informally signaled their willingness to 
reduce amounts owed in a recent AHLA webinar for health-care at-
torneys.  In the webinar, the presenters representing the government 
listed several “subfactors” that CMS considers in settlements: (1) 
whether the arrangement was commercially reasonable and/or at fair 
market value, (2) whether the arrangement took into account the vol-
ume or value of referrals, (3) whether there was a history of program 
abuse, (4) whether the amount in question was set in advance, (5) the 
presence and strength of a preexisting compliance program, (6) the 
length and pervasiveness of the noncompliance, and (7) the steps 
taken to correct the noncompliance.196  These factors have not been 
released in any official pronouncement.197  Notably absent from the 
list is any consideration of whether patients or the program actually 
suffered any harm as a result of the arrangement and whether the vio-
lation resulted from an innocent mistake or so-called “technical” error. 
Leaving aside those considerations, the SRDP does not specify 
how CMS will determine the dollar amount of the claims made pursu-
ant to a noncompliant financial relationship.  Will it be based on the 
number of patients admitted by the physician?  Sometimes there are 
multiple physicians involved in one admission.  If Dr. House admits a 
patient, but other physicians or providers, such as physical therapists 
or medical equipment providers, also bill the government for services 
  
 195 AHA Letter, supra note 8, at 3. 
 196 Troy Barsky & Roy Albert, Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Am. 
Health Lawyers Ass’n Webinar Presentation, The New Reality of Stark Self-
Disclosures: What to Do and Not Do, at 14 (Nov. 19, 2010) (on file with author). 
 197 Id. 
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as a result of the initial hospital admission, will the value of those 
products and services be considered part of the basis for the penalty?    
For example, in the above-mentioned Saints Medical Center 
case,198 CMS could base the government’s claim on the amounts 
billed to the Medicare program for all services provided to all patients 
treated by the physician involved in the noncompliant financial rela-
tionship.  Clearly, CMS did not take that position, since the hospital’s 
attorneys were very pleased with the settlement relative to what it 
could have been.  But we do not know what the basis was for CMS’s 
calculation of the penalty, since it did not release that information.  
The penalty might have been lowered because CMS decided the situa-
tion did not really harm the Medicare program, or because the physi-
cians involved simply had not admitted many patients who cost the 
Medicare program significant amounts of money.  In other words, is 
CMS discounting the value of its claim based on equitable factors that 
it did not wish to specify either to the provider or to the public? 
The OIG, in contrast to CMS, demonstrated its willingness to set-
tle for less than the face value of the claim in several cases settled 
prior to the OIG’s announcement that it would not accept “Stark-only” 
settlements in the SDP.  For instance, the failure of Cushing Memorial 
Hospital in Leavenworth, Kansas to have a rental agreement with a 
physician using space in the hospital’s medical office building re-
sulted in a Stark violation.199  The OIG settled for $50,000, despite the 
fact that the physician’s referrals had resulted in millions of dollars in 
claims.200  The OIG could have insisted on repayment of all of those 
claims and possibly even CMPs or penalties under the FCA that are a 
multiplier of the amount of the claims. 
In another case, Memorial Hospital of Union County in 
Marysville, Ohio paid $31,000 in CMPs.  The hospital had exceeded 
by $3,000 the $355 Stark cap on nonmonetary compensation of physi-
cians.201  The penalty would have been enormous if the OIG had fo-
cused on the value of referrals made by the physicians, rather than the 
minimal financial benefit the hospital had actually conferred upon 
those physicians.  When these settlements were announced, an attor-
ney representing a number of hospitals and physicians hailed the set-
tlements as possible “cornerstone cases with respect to the application 
of Stark and repayments.  They show there is a substantial ability to 
  
 198 See supra Part III.B. 
 199 Hospital Settles CMP Case After OIG Discovers No Problem in Referral 
Pattern, REP. ON MEDICARE COMPLIANCE, Oct. 2009. 
 200 Id. at 2. 
 201 Id. 
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negotiate a reasonable amount.”202  However, the OIG’s subsequent 
closure of its program to Stark-only disclosures put an end to this 
short-lived optimism in the provider community regarding Stark en-
forcement.203  
The CMS disclosure protocol also contrasts with New York 
State’s Medicaid self-disclosure program in terms of its willingness to 
offer a reduction in penalties as a reward for self-disclosure.  The New 
York Office of the Medicaid Inspector General (OMIG) released its 
Self-Disclosure Guidance in March 2009.204  The OMIG’s guidance 
states that its program is aimed at encouraging providers to find prob-
lems within their own organization, reveal those issues to the OMIG, 
and return inappropriate payments.205  The OMIG disclosure protocol 
is written in general terms and includes all program integrity issues 
rather than the specific statutes that the CMS and OIG protocols 
cover.206  The OMIG disclosure protocol states that providers who 
self-disclose overpayments will typically have a better outcome than 
if the OMIG had discovered the matter independently.207  The specific 
benefits to self-disclosure that the OMIG cites in its protocol include:  
 
• forgiveness or reduction of interest payments;  
• extended repayment terms;  
• waiver of penalties and/or sanctions;  
• recognition of the effectiveness of the provider’s 
compliance program;  
• a decrease in the likelihood of imposition of an 
OMIG Corporate Integrity Program; and  
• possible preclusion of subsequently filed New 
York State False Claims Act qui tam actions based 
on the disclosed matters. 208 
 
  
 202 Id. (discussing attorney Robert Wade’s comments regarding OIG’s will-
ingness to set lower CMPs for hospitals who voluntarily disclose alleged Stark viola-
tions). 
 203 See Open Letter from Daniel R. Levinson, supra note 111. 
 204 STATE OF N.Y. OFFICE OF THE MEDICAID INSPECTOR GEN., SELF-
DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE (Mar. 12, 2009) [hereinafter N.Y. SELF-DISCLOSURE 
GUIDANCE], 
http://www.omig.state.ny.us/data/images/stories/self_disclosure/omig_provider_self_
disclosure_guidance.pdf. 
 205 Id. at 1. 
 206 Id. at 3.  Disclosures may include substantial routine errors and patterns of 
errors, as well as issues implicating potential violations of fraud and abuse laws. 
 207 Id. at 2. 
 208 Id. 
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3. Failure to Distinguish Between Procedural 
and Substantive Violations 
While many of the disadvantages of using the SRDP apply to all 
SRDP disclosures, the disadvantages are particularly acute when the 
underlying violation of the law is procedural rather than substantive.  
As discussed above, CMS considered and ultimately rejected any dis-
tinction between procedural and substantive violations in the Stark 
regulations themselves, except the very narrow exception provided for 
missing signatures.209   
The SRDP does not make any distinction between minor viola-
tions that do not affect the integrity of government health-care pro-
grams and violations that go to the heart of why the legislation was 
enacted.  Presumably, a procedural violation would fare well in con-
sideration of the “nature and extent of the improper or illegal prac-
tice,”210 but CMS has not said so directly.  Attorneys Katherine Lauer 
and Robert Roth, speaking to an AHLA webinar audience in June 
2011, stated that they had heard that CMS may be considering refer-
ring matters that are not simply “technical” issues to the OIG.211  That 
would leave only the technical or procedural issues to be dealt with 
under the SRDP.  If CMS were to remove all substantive issues from 
the SRDP, it would only serve to sharpen providers’ complaints that 
the SRDP as currently structured is unnecessarily punitive and unfair 
to providers who have simply failed to sign an agreement or have al-
lowed a signed agreement to lapse.   
 
4. Deadline for Disclosure 
The SRDP requires the disclosing provider to act quickly, yet 
quite comprehensively.  Some practitioners have stated that the sixty-
day requirement for repayment of overpayments under the ACA 
means that providers must disclose within sixty days to be able to take 
advantage of the SRDP.212  As some attorneys have noted: 
 
Sixty days is a short time frame to conduct a thorough 
internal review of potential noncompliance, come to 
conclusions about whether a violation has occurred, 
assemble descriptions of the potential causes of the in-
cident or practice at issue, draft descriptions of any 
  
 209 See supra Part I.E. 
 210 SRDP, supra note 9, at 6. 
 211 Lauer & Roth, supra note 11, at 25. 
 212 Christ et al., supra note 151. 
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similar conduct and of the compliance program, design 
remedial actions and describe them, conduct an accu-
rate financial analysis of the potential repayment and 
present all these materials to the compliance commit-
tee and/or governing body for review/approval for fil-
ing with CMS.  The timetable for this process raises 
serious questions as to whether the SRDP process is a 
meaningful opportunity for providers to resolve sig-
nificant or complex legal areas of potential noncom-
pliance.213 
 
The information that must be provided in that short amount of 
time is actually more comprehensive and definitive than that required 
in the OIG SDP.  The SDP allows the provider to conduct its internal 
review after the initial disclosure to the government.  The OIG agrees 
not to investigate on its own while the provider conducts its internal 
review, according to the OIG’s guidelines as laid out in the SDP.214  
The CMS SRDP has no similar process for allowing incremental 
submission of information by providers.  In fact, under the SRDP, the 
provider must conduct a “complete legal analysis,” including identifi-
cation of the specific requirements of all exceptions under Stark and 
explanations as to why the organization fails to meet them.215  Pre-
sumably, a disclosure needs to include a legal memorandum by an 
attorney in order to fulfill this requirement.  
 If CMS determines that the information given by the provider is not 
sufficient, CMS may decide not to accept a disclosure into the SRDP.  
Attorney Robert Wade represents five providers who applied to re-
solve Stark problems through the SRDP.  He reported that in two 
cases, CMS accepted the submissions but asked for more documenta-
tion before it accepted the submissions; in two other cases, CMS 
asked for additional information, but has not yet notified as to whether 
it will accept the submissions.  CMS has not yet responded to the fifth 
disclosure.216 
 
  
 213 Id. 
 214 OIG’s Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol, supra note 108, at 58,401. 
 215 SRDP, supra note 9, at 4. 
 216 Nina Youngstrom, First Stark Case is Resolved Through CMS Self-
Disclosure; is the OIG Option Gone?, REP. ON MEDICARE COMPLIANCE, Feb. 2011, at 
2. 
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5. Determining To Which Agency Disclosure Is 
Best Made 
The SRDP states that parties should not disclose the same behav-
ior to both the OIG and CMS.217  Due to the fact that most situations 
that raise Stark issues also raise Anti-Kickback issues, providers often 
face a dilemma when deciding which disclosure protocol to use.  Pro-
viders conceivably prefer to use the “Stark-only” SRDP when possi-
ble, rather than admit that they may have violated the criminal Anti-
Kickback statute, which requires the OIG SDP.  Another advantage to 
using the SRDP is that CMS has the authority to release providers 
from Stark liability,218 whereas the OIG does not.   
Despite these advantages, providers often prefer to disclose that 
there is a colorable Anti-Kickback claim so that they can work with 
the OIG rather than the CMS.  In the words of one attorney who ad-
vises health-care providers, the OIG’s “clear guidance and reasoned 
approach to penalty determination” makes disclosure to the OIG pref-
erable to disclosure to CMS.219  Also, if a provider decides to go the 
Stark-only route and discloses to CMS, the agency may refer the mat-
ter to the OIG or DOJ if it decides during the course of its investiga-
tion that there is a colorable Anti-Kickback claim.220  Indeed, the 
SRDP warns that CMS may use material in the disclosure itself as 
evidence against the provider in its decision to make a referral to the 
OIG or DOJ.221  In that situation, the provider will not have the oppor-
tunity for any leniency under the OIG SDP.  So, providers would do 
well to heed CMS’s advice in the SRDP that “the disclosing party’s 
initial decision of where to disclose a matter . . . should be made care-
fully.”222   
 
  
 217 SRDP, supra note 9, at 2. 
 218 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 
6409(b), 124 Stat. 119, 772 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn note). 
 219 Larry C. Conn, Navigating CMS’ Channel for Stark Disclosures, J. 
HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE, Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 25, 28; see also Michelle C. Gabriel 
McGovern, Medicare Physician Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol: Will the Truth Set 
You Free?, J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE, Jan.-Feb. 2011, at 59, 60 (comparing the 
OIG and CMS disclosure protocols and concluding that absent further clarification by 
CMS, its SRDP offers no significant additional benefits to disclosing providers). 
 220 SRDP, supra note 9, at 2-3. 
 221 Id. at 3. 
 222 Id. 
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6. The “Look-Back” Period 
One of the most significant issues for self-disclosing providers is 
the length of time CMS will “look-back” from the date of the disclo-
sure to determine the extent of the illegal conduct.  The “look-back” 
period is a major determinant of the total overpayment and penalties 
that will be due.  Many of the financial relationships between hospi-
tals and physicians, such as departmental directorships, can extend for 
decades, creating a major problem for an entity seeking closure on a 
lapsed contract, for example.  
The SRDP requires a disclosing party to state the total amount 
that is actually or potentially owed based on the applicable “look-
back” period.223  The SRDP defines the “look-back” period as the 
length of the time during which the disclosing party may not have 
been in compliance with the provider self-referral law.224  When the 
protocol was first published, many commentators raised concerns 
regarding the open-ended nature of this definition.225  The definition 
conceivably extends the “look-back” period beyond that for which the 
provider would be liable if the government learned of the conduct 
through means other than self-disclosure.   
Normally, HHS may reopen a hospital’s filed claims for up to 
four years from the date of the initial determination or redetermination 
when “good cause” to reopen the claim exists. 226  Good cause is said 
to exist when there is:  
 
new and material evidence that was not available or 
known at the time of the determination or decision and 
may result in a different conclusion; or [t]he evidence 
that was considered in making the determination or 
decision clearly shows on its face that an obvious error 
  
 223 Id. at 5. 
 224 Id. 
 225 See Goel & Melvin, supra note 57 (recognizing that although the SRDP 
refers to regulatory time limitations on look-back periods, neither the protocol nor 
CMS has indicated how they may be applied in a self-disclosure); see also Young-
strom, supra note 216, at 2 (a provider’s documentation of an entire look-back period 
can be “fairly extensive . . . and can be burdensome,” quoting attorney Kevin McA-
naney, former chief OIG’s Industry Guidance Branch). 
 226 42 C.F.R. § 405.980(b)(2) (2010).  The government may reopen a claim at 
any time if “reliable evidence,” as defined in 42 C.F.R. § 405.902, exists that the 
initial determination was procured by fraud.  Presumably that section would not apply 
in most “pure Stark” cases, particularly in those cases involving only procedural 
violations of the statute.  Id. 
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was made at the time of the determination or deci-
sion.227   
 
Even in the most serious of Stark violations where the FCA is impli-
cated, the statute of limitations is six years.228    
Thus, the effect of CMS’s look-back period is to extend what 
would otherwise be a shorter statute of limitations.  CMS representa-
tives recently stated that the agency did indeed intend to create an 
open-ended look-back period for the SRDP.229  Thus, self-disclosure 
under the SRDP potentially exposes the provider to more liability than 
would be allowable under law in the event the noncompliance was 
discovered by the government in some manner other than self-
disclosure.  In contrast, the New York OMIG takes an alternative ap-
proach, providing a clear six-year “look-back” period with limited 
exceptions.230   
 
7. Waiver of Attorney Client Privilege 
Once a provider enters into the SRDP, the provider must provide 
CMS “access to all financial statements, notes, disclosures, and other 
supporting documents without the assertion of privileges or limita-
tions. . . .”231  Although CMS has specified that it will not request 
written material that is subject to attorney-client privilege, it also 
states that if there are documents or other materials which it believes 
are critical, it will discuss with a disclosing party’s counsel “ways to 
gain access to the underlying information without waiver of protec-
tions provided by an appropriately asserted claim of privilege.”232  
Providers remain concerned that a self-disclosure might result in 
waiving the privilege.233 
  
 227 CMS, MEDICARE CLAIMS PROCESSING MANUAL: CHAPTER 34 - AEOPENING 
AND REVISION OF CLAIM DETERMINATIONS AND DECISIONS §10.11 (revised June 17, 
2011), available at https://www.cms.gov/manuals/downloads/ clm104c34.pdf. 
 228 False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(1) (2006). 
 229 Carlson, supra note 130 (“The CMS will request to see the entire amount 
of questionable remuneration, regardless of any statute of limitations that would apply 
in a court process.”). 
 230 Sheehan & Hussar, supra  note 19, at 31 (“OMIG will not require or ex-
pect providers to look-back more than six years from the date of disclosure unless the 
disclosure involves a base year cost report, or OMIG determines that there is a basis 
to suspect fraud.”). 
 231 SRDP, supra note 9, at 5. 
 232 Id. 
 233 See Christ et al., supra note 151 (concluding the potential waiver of privi-
lege is an uncertainty in the SRDP process which is a “critically important considera-
tion that disclosing parties should weigh carefully”); Conn, supra note 219, at 69 
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8. Statement Regarding Past Conduct 
The SRDP requires participants to include a statement “identify-
ing whether the disclosing party has a history of similar conduct or 
has any prior criminal, civil and regulatory enforcement actions 
against it.”234  There doesn’t appear to be any time limitation on this 
requirement.  The phrase “a history of similar conduct” is quite am-
biguous.  Does “similar” refer to a specific type of issue, such as fail-
ure to obtain a signature, or does it consider all the facts and circum-
stances of the particular disclosure?  For example, consider again Dr. 
House’s failure to sign his agreement that otherwise complied with a 
Stark exception.  If neither party noticed the lack of a signature for 
five years, is that “similar” to a future situation in which the hospital 
failed to obtain a signature but discovered it after five weeks?  Sup-
pose that in the first instance, the hospital had a change of personnel 
and the department head responsible for the agreement left the hospi-
tal.  By the time of the second incident, the hospital had implemented 
a new contract management system, and that system caught the lack 
of a signature.  Clearly, the hospital’s overall compliance program had 
improved significantly between the two incidents, and yet CMS may 
consider the two situations “similar” and expect disclosure of the sec-
ond incident even though it meets the SRDP exception for self-
correction of a missing signature.235 
 The requirement for determining whether the hospital has had a 
“similar” situation exacerbates the time pressure on providers who 
need to compare different situations before making a conclusion about 
their similarity.  The OIG SDP allows providers to supply additional 
information after the initial disclosure,236 which gives the provider a 
chance to amend any initial statements about the provider’s historical 
compliance if its investigation uncovers a previously unrecognized 
pattern of similar conduct.  The SRDP does not allow amendment 
after submission. 
 
  
(“CMS may insist on review of materials that may be covered by the work product 
doctrine.”). 
 234 See supra note 9, at 4. 
 235 See supra Part I.F. 
 236 See N.Y. SELF-DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE, supra note 204, at 4. 
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9. Lack of Appeal Rights 
There is no right of appeal from a voluntary settlement agreement 
with CMS resolving a self-disclosed violation.237  By contrast, if a 
provider’s compliance issues were discovered in an investigation or 
through some other means, the provider would have full rights to ap-
peal any administrative penalty or court decision unless the provider 
waived those rights in a settlement.  The SRDP does state that if an 
entity does not satisfactorily resolve the issue with CMS through the 
protocol and ultimately withdraws from the process, CMS has the 
authority to issue overpayment determinations based on the informa-
tion it gained from the self-disclosure.  The provider would then be 
able to appeal those determinations through the normal administrative 
processes.238  So, providers have at least some leverage on this point, 
since they can simply threaten to walk away from the self-disclosure 
resolution process if they are concerned that CMS will not reach an 
acceptable conclusion.  If they choose this option, CMS will likely 
turn the matter over to the OIG or the DOJ for investigation and 
prosecution.239   
Of course, the outcome may not always be readily apparent.  In 
the Saints Medical Center disclosure discussed in Part III.B, the hospi-
tal’s counsel reported that they had no idea how CMS came to the 
settlement amount it did.240  While Saints’ counsel was pleased with 
the settlement, had they not been, they would have had to choose to 
roll the dice on an appeal after investing significant time and money in 
the self-disclosure process.  
 
10. Implications for the Provider’s Compliance 
Plan 
Finally, it is unclear what the implications of self-disclosure are 
for the provider’s compliance plan.  The SRDP requires providers to 
supply “a description of the potential causes of the incident or practice 
(e.g., intentional conduct, lack of internal controls, circumvention of 
corporate procedures or Government regulations).”241  It goes on to 
state that the provider must also supply: 
  
 237 SRDP, supra note 9, at 2. 
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. at 2-3, 6 (discussing cooperation between CMS, OIG, and the DOJ 
when considering a provider’s “lack of cooperation” in determining an “appropriate 
resolution to the [disclosed] matter”).   
 240 Kass et al., supra note 12, at 37:54 (discussing Saints Medical disclosure 
by Saints’ attorney Christine Savage). 
 241 SRDP, supra note 9, at 4. 
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[a] description of the existence and adequacy of a pre-
existing compliance program that the disclosing party 
had, and all efforts by the disclosing party to prevent a 
recurrence of the incident or practice in the affected 
division as well as in any related health care entities 
(e.g., new accounting or internal control procedures, 
new training programs, increased internal audit efforts, 
increased supervision by higher management).242  
 
In light of these requirements, providers question whether CMS 
views a disclosure as evidence of the effectiveness or lack of effec-
tiveness of a compliance plan.  This ambiguity contrasts with the ex-
plicit statement of the New York OMIG that a disclosure will be taken 
as evidence that the provider’s compliance plan is effective.243 
 
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR A DEMONSTRATION PROJECT TO TEST 
MODIFICATIONS 
A. Benefits of a Demonstration Project 
The central question raised in this Article is whether there are 
changes that could be made to the SRDP to encourage providers to 
disclose more violations, while also avoiding the risk of Medicare 
program abuse by providers due to simpler procedures and less gov-
ernmental scrutiny.  Prior to the release of the current SRDP, other 
authors suggested more provider-friendly procedures than were ulti-
mately adopted by CMS.244  Since the agency did not explain why it 
did not include any of these ideas in the SRDP, we can only guess as 
to its reasons.  Presumably, CMS was concerned that the integrity of 
Medicare would be compromised if providers took undue advantage 
of the flexibility or limited penalties embodied in these suggestions.  
A demonstration project would offer an opportunity to test these ideas 
without risking the integrity of the entire Medicare system.  If any of 
the ideas prove too fraught with difficulties in administration or result 
in providers’ failing to fully and truthfully describe their situations in 
disclosures, the risks to the Medicare program will have been limited 
to the test region. 
A more provider-friendly demonstration protocol offers an oppor-
tunity to gain several important insights.  First, CMS would learn 
whether providers would respond by significantly increasing the num-
  
 242 Id. 
 243 N.Y. SELF-DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE, supra note 204, at 2. 
 244 See infra Part I.F. 
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ber of disclosures and therefore the amount of money the government 
recovers for the Medicare Trust Fund.245  Second, CMS would learn 
which protocol provisions are most significant in provider self-
disclosure decisions.  Third, CMS would learn a great deal about how 
hospitals contract with physicians, including what provisions in those 
contracts are typical of the industry as a whole, and which are more 
unusual and possibly more problematic.   
Finally, CMS would also learn about providers’ recordkeeping 
practices and approaches to documentation of fair market value.  CMS 
has demonstrated its interest in this type of information.  In 2008, the 
agency launched a program to gather data on physicians’ relationships 
with hospitals.  Ultimately the program was halted because CMS de-
termined that the ACA’s disclosure requirements may result in dupli-
cative information.  However, CMS stated that “[it] remain[s] inter-
ested in analyzing physicians’ compensation relationships.”246 
If the information CMS gleaned from the project supported its 
concerns about significant provider abuses, the agency could use the 
information to craft better enforcement programs and tighter regula-
tions, or to target particular industry segments where problems are 
more rampant.  CMS would gain a more accurate understanding of 
which providers are likely to be engaged in significant misconduct.  
If, on the other hand, the information gathered showed that current 
Stark regulations are overly restrictive and ineffective at recovering 
funds, the agency could relax Stark enforcement and shift the re-
sources to other parts of the health-care industry or to other health-
care statutes.  At a minimum, a more provider-friendly protocol with 
simpler, faster resolution of issues would avoid the expense of com-
plex investigations of and negotiations with providers whose viola-
tions are less serious.  Instead, CMS could focus on more serious vio-
lators. 
Providers in the demonstration project region could take advan-
tage of lower costs of settlement and decreased risk of penalties, par-
ticularly for technical violations.  The pilot program would make the 
cost benefit analysis for self-disclosure less lopsided, so that doing the 
right thing would not put a provider in financial or legal peril.  If CMS 
decided to use the results of the project to make the SRDP more pro-
vider-friendly, providers across the United States would reap the 
benefits. 
  
 245 The Medicare Trust Fund collectively refers to the Federal Hospital Insur-
ance Trust Fund (Medicare Part A) and the Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance 
Trust Fund (Medicare Parts B and D).  Costs for beneficiaries under these programs 
are paid out of the Medicare Trust Fund.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i, 1395t (2006). 
 246 See DFRR, supra note 15, and accompanying text. 
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B. Past Demonstration Projects 
1. CMS Projects 
 HHS has conducted numerous demonstration projects related to 
Medicare.  The ACA gives HHS broad authority to create demonstra-
tion projects that test various ideas for decreasing costs or improving 
care delivery in federal health-care programs.247  While some demon-
stration project recommendations are outlined in the legislation,248 
HHS also has general authority to develop or demonstrate improved 
methods for the investigation and prosecution of fraud in federal 
health-care programs.249  Some carried out by CMS in the past include 
(1) a value-based purchasing initiative designed to tie Medicare pay-
ments to performance on quality and efficiency, (2) the Hospital Qual-
ity Incentive Demonstration, (3) the Physician Group Practice Dem-
onstration to improve care of patients with chronic illnesses or requir-
ing preventive care, and (4) the Medicare Care Management Perform-
ance Demonstration.250   
 CMS is currently involved in two demonstration projects with im-
plications for fraud and abuse regulations.251  These projects concern 
“gainsharing” between hospitals and physicians.  Gainsharing pro-
grams involve hospitals paying physicians a share of the savings that 
result from collaborative efforts between the hospital and the physi-
cian to improve quality and efficiency in care delivery.252  Gainshar-
  
 247 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 
3021(a), 124 Stat. 119, 389 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)) (creating 
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation). 
 248 § 6409(a), 124 Stat. at 390-92 (recommending twenty project models, 
including the promotion of broad payment and practice reform in primary care, and 
provision of payment to providers for using patient decision-support tools that im-
prove individual understanding of medical treatment options). 
 249 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-1(a)(1)(J) (2006). 
 250 Master Demonstration, Evaluation, and Research Studies for ORDI Sys-
tem of Record 09-70-0591: List of Projects, CMS.GOV, 5-8, 
http://www.cms.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/MasterSORList.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2011). 
 251 DRA 5007 Medicare Hospital Gainsharing Demonstration, CMS.GOV 
(2006), 
https://www.cms.gov/demoprojectsevalrpts/md/itemdetail.asp?itemid=CMS1186805; 
MMA Section 646 Physician Hospital Collaboration Demonstration, CMS.GOV 
(2006), 
https://www.cms.gov/demoprojectsevalrpts/md/itemdetail.asp?itemid=CMS1186653. 
 252 DRA 5007 Medicare Hospital Gainsharing Demonstration, CMS.GOV, 1, 
http://www.cms.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/DRA5007_Solicitation.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 8, 2011). 
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ing implicates two specific fraud and abuse statutes: (1) the civil 
monetary penalty law, which prohibits a hospital from knowingly 
making a payment, directly or indirectly, to a physician as an induce-
ment to reduce or limit items or services furnished to Medicare or 
Medicaid beneficiaries;253 and (2) the Anti-Kickback Statute if one 
purpose of the cost-savings payment is to influence referrals of federal 
health-care program business by the physicians.254   
The New Jersey Hospital Association initially proposed a gain-
sharing demonstration project in 2004, but at that time, CMS did not 
have the statutory authority to waive gainsharing restrictions.255  The 
Deficit Reduction Act and amendments to the Social Security Act 
subsequently gave CMS the necessary authority.256  CMS’s two gain-
sharing demonstrations included various restrictions to protect the 
Medicare program, such as a requirement that payments to physicians 
could not be payments for referrals that would violate the Anti-
Kickback Statute.257   
CMS has not yet released results of the project that ended in 2009, 
but Jonathan Blum, director of CMS’s Center for Medicare Manage-
ment and acting director of the Center for Health Plan Choices, stated 
in 2009, “[w]hat we learn from the various Medicare demonstrations 
help [sic] to achieve the Administration’s goals of paying for high 
quality and efficient health care in America . . . . Building on these 
findings, we will aggressively test new demonstration concepts to 
continue to meet these goals.”258 
 
2. OIG Pilot Project on Self-Disclosure 
 The OIG has already applied the demonstration program concept in 
the area of provider self-disclosure.  In 1995, OIG launched a program 
called “Operation Restore Trust” (ORT) to respond to a surge of 
  
 253 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(b)(1). 
 254 Id. § 1320a-7b(b)(2). 
 255 Cinda Becker, Pilot Crashes, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Apr. 19, 2004), 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20040419/NEWS/404190321/.   
 256 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (2011); Medicare Program: Solicitation for Proposals 
to Participate in the Medicare Hospital Gainsharing Demonstration Program Under 
Section 5007 of the Deficit Reduction Act, 71 Fed. Reg. 54,664, 54,664 (Sept. 18, 
2006); 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-3 (2011). 
 257 DRA 5007 Medicare Hospital Gainsharing Demonstration, supra note 
252, at 4, 6. 
 258 Medicare Says Demonstration Projects Proving Paying For Quality 
Health Care Pays Off, SENIOR JOURNAL (Aug. 26, 2009), 
http://seniorjournal.com/NEWS/Medicare/2009/20090826-
MedicareSaysDemonstration.htm (quoting Jonathan Blum, Director of CMS Center 
for Medicare Management and Acting Director for Center for Health Plan Choices). 
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fraud, waste, and abuse in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.259  
One of the initiatives included in ORT was a two-year pilot of a vol-
untary self-disclosure program, targeting home health and nursing 
facility suppliers and providers in five states.  Together, the five states 
accounted for 40 percent of Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries.260  
The program was based on an approach taken by the Department of 
Defense starting in 1986 for self-disclosed incidents of fraud by de-
fense contractors.261    
The OIG’s main purpose in developing the program was to in-
crease industry participation in the detection and prevention of Medi-
care and Medicaid fraud and abuse.  From the OIG’s perspective, the 
program offered providers a way to decrease potential costs from gov-
ernmental audits and investigations and avoid possible exclusion from 
Medicare and Medicaid.  In addition, the program offered insight into 
industry patterns and practices.262  The OIG learned from the program, 
and then used that knowledge to refine its approach before releasing 
its current self-disclosure protocol nationwide in 1998.263 
 
C. Proposed Provisions of a Stark Self-Disclosure 
Demonstration Project  
Just as CMS is currently using demonstration projects to learn 
about various parts of the health-care industry, and just as the OIG 
piloted a novel approach to self-disclosure several years ago, so CMS 
should now use the opportunity afforded by the ACA to experiment 
with ways to make the SRDP more effective.  CMS should specifi-
cally include the following in a new Stark self-disclosure demonstra-
tion project: (1) a two-track process, (2) a flat penalty for procedural 
violations, and (3) an explicit statement of tangible benefits in the 
SRDP.   
 
  
 259 OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., 
OPERATION RESTORE TRUST ACTIVITIES 1 (Nov. 1995) [hereinafter OPERATION 
RESTORE TRUST], http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-12-96-00020.pdf. 
 260 Id. 
 261 See generally DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE 
PROGRAM, supra note 109, at 1. 
 262 OPERATION RESTORE TRUST, supra note 259, at 34. 
 263 OIG’s Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol, supra note 108, at 58,399-400 
(establishing that OIG’s current protocol eliminated a number of provisions found in 
the pilot program, including: pre-disclosure requirements and preliminary qualifying 
characteristics, disclosures limited to particular health-care industries, and automatic 
preclusion of providers from disclosure if already subject to a government inquiry). 
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1. Two-Track Process  
Prior to the release of the current SRDP, the AHA suggested a 
two-track system for disclosures that offers an excellent framework 
for a demonstration project.  Under the AHA proposal, Track I would 
allow for expedited reviews, similar to “desk audits” at many agen-
cies.264  This type of review would facilitate disclosure of situations 
that can be resolved on the basis of evidence provided by the disclos-
ing party.  The agency would verify the data provided, but would not 
conduct a full-scale investigation.265  The AHA offered missing signa-
tures, mistaken payments, mistaken non-collection of payment, and 
holdover leases as examples of matters that could be handled on an 
expedited basis.266  Track II would be for more complex matters that 
need a detailed review by CMS.  The AHA identified arrangements 
with “complex payment methodologies” or situations where “the ex-
tent to which the self-referral law applies is unclear” as good candi-
dates for Track II review.267  The AHA emphasized that CMS should 
be flexible in administering the two tiers and that “[t]he SRDP should 
not attempt to define the circumstances or categories of arrangements 
for which the protocol is available.  To do so would limit its utility 
and the ability of the agency to appropriately address complex situa-
tions that must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.”268   
CMS did not publicly explain why it rejected the AHA’s two-
track proposal.  However, CMS’s response to public comments on the 
2008 proposed rulemaking may provide a clue.  CMS rejected a pro-
posal to allow parties who inadvertently failed to conform to a proce-
dural requirement the opportunity to “self-correct,” or, in other words, 
fix the problem going forward and not disclose the problem.  CMS 
stated that it did not believe that this proposal met the “no risk of pro-
gram or patient abuse” standard.269   
  
 264 A desk audit, or review, is conducted by an agency based on correspon-
dence or phone interviews with the subject of the review rather than an on-site visit 
by the agency.  For example, CMS Medicare contractors conduct desk reviews of 
health-care provider cost reports to determine whether the report can be settled with-
out completion of a full audit.  CMS, MEDICARE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT MANUAL, 
ch. 8 § 20, available at https://www.cms.gov/manuals/downloads/fin106c08.pdf (last 
reviewed June 12, 2009).  
 265 AHA Letter, supra note 8, at 2. 
 266 Id. 
 267 Id. at 3. 
 268 Id. 
 269 Alternative Method for Compliance with Signature Requirements in Cer-
tain Exceptions, 73 Fed. Reg. 48,434, 48,707 (Aug. 19, 2008) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 
411.353(g)). 
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A demonstration project could incorporate the AHA two-track 
framework while still addressing CMS’s concern.  For simple matters, 
such as missing signatures or non-collection of payment, CMS could 
require providers to disclose the violation, but only require a desk 
audit rather than a full investigation.  If any facts came to light during 
the desk audit that caused CMS to be concerned that the provider had 
not fully disclosed all the issues, CMS could move the matter to Track 
II and conduct a full investigation.  For most simple matters, neither 
CMS nor providers would have to worry about a time-consuming and 
expensive investigation.  This process would address provider con-
cerns raised in the AHLA survey on OIG disclosures that many of the 
disclosures resulted in investigations that dragged on for many months 
or even years.270 
 
2. Flat Penalty for Procedural Violations  
In situations where the government does not allege any intent to 
steer referrals to a provider, CMS should exercise its discretion to 
sever the link entirely between Stark violations and the value of so-
called “tainted” referrals.271  If the service in question was necessary 
and provided properly, neither the government nor any patient has 
been harmed.  The dollar value of the service should be irrelevant to 
the penalty calculation.  Furthermore, the conduct to be punished 
should be the failure to document the arrangement.  Whether the phy-
sician billed millions of dollars or only a few dollars to the Medicare 
program should be irrelevant to the penalty assessed for the con-
duct.272   
Four prominent health-care attorneys whose practices include a 
significant amount of Stark work273 have used this notion as the basis 
  
 270 Voluntary Disclosure Survey, supra note 153, §11 (follow “View 65 Re-
sponses” hyperlink to Responses 27 and 58 for Question 11 which state: “very slow 
process” and “[t]ook a long, long, long time”). 
 271 See A Proposal for Resolving Technical Stark Violations, AM. HEALTH 
LAWYERS ASS’N 1, 
http://www.healthlawyers.org/Events/Programs/Materials/Documents/AM10/holden_
proposal.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2011). 
 272 Id. at 2. 
 273 The authors are Robert Homchick, Sanford Teplitzsky, Beth Schermer and 
Craig Holden.  Robert Homchick is a partner with Davis, Wright, Tremaine LLP and 
a past member of the American Health Lawyers Board of Directors.  Robert G. (Bob) 
Homchick, DAVIS, WRIGHT, TREMAINE LLP, 
http://www.dwt.com/People/RobertGHomchick (last visited Jan. 11, 2012).  Sanford 
Teplitzky is a partner with Ober Kaler and a former Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare counsel. Sanford Teplitzky, OBER KALER, 
http://www.ober.com/attorneys/sanford-teplitzky (last visited Jan. 11, 2012).  Beth 
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for a proposal they made in 2010 to CMS prior to its release of the 
SRDP.274  In their proposal (Homchick Proposal), the attorneys sug-
gested that CMS establish a flat $5,000 penalty for procedural Stark 
violations.  They lobbied CMS and discussed the idea with other 
health-care attorneys in an attempt to create popular support for it.  
The Homchick Proposal stated that:  
 
[t]he category of arrangements that would qualify for 
summary disposition should include arrangements in 
which (1) the compensation is [at fair market value] 
and does not vary with referrals; (2) the failure to fit 
within an exception is due to the lack of an adequate 
[written agreement]; (3) the entity can prove by parole 
evidence that the compensation for the arrangement 
was set in advance; and (4) the failure to have a suffi-
cient [written agreement] was inadvertent (i.e.[,] the 
failure was attributable to negligence [rather than] a 
knowing violation of the Stark requirements).275   
 
They suggested that the penalty be assessed per arrangement, and 
commented that, “in our experience, noncompliant arrangements 
rarely occur in isolation.”276  This proposal addressed the same type of 
violations as the AHA two-track proposal, but went further than the 
AHA proposal in suggesting the notion of a flat penalty.  It also ex-
pressly limited the availability of a desk audit to procedural violations, 
something the AHA resisted doing.   
In support of their proposal, the attorneys argued that it  
 
would allow CMS to focus enforcement resources in areas 
where Stark law violations present real concern and damage 
to the Medicare program.  The proposal would encourage 
self-disclosure, create a pathway for the fair and equitable 
  
Schermer is a partner with Christofolo Schermer LLC.  Beth Schermer, CHRISTOFOLO 
SCHERMER LLC, http://www.christofoloschermer.com/schermer.html (last visited Jan. 
11, 2012).  Mr. Teplitzky and Ms. Schermer are both past presidents of the American 
Health Lawyers Association and recipients of its David Greenberg award for service.  
Id.; Sanford Teplitzky, supra.  Craig Holden is President of Ober Kaler and a former 
trial attorney with the Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General. S. 
Craig Holden, OBER KALER, http://www.ober.com/attorneys/s-holden (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2012). 
 274 Robert Homchick, Proposed Stark Technical Violation Fix, AM. HEALTH 
LAWYERS ASS’N (May 3, 2010, 11:06 AM) (on file with author). 
 275 A Proposal for Resolving Technical Stark Violations, supra note 271, at 2. 
 276 Id. 
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resolution of the hundreds, if not thousands, of technical vio-
lations in the provider community and avoid the waste of en-
forcement resources on these technical violations.277  
 
The AHA also suggested a penalty scheme similar to that sug-
gested by the Homchick Proposal.  The AHA proposed stipulated 
damages “for categories of violations posing the least risk of harm to 
the program or its beneficiaries” in amounts ranging up to $10,000.278  
The AHA cited agreements with missing signatures or situations 
where an arrangement was otherwise compliant with an exception but 
had not been documented in the manner specified in the regulations, 
as examples of situations where the stipulated penalties would apply.  
The AHA suggested that this provision should be applicable regard-
less of whether the situation qualified for expedited review or not un-
der its two-track proposal.279 
CMS did not comment publicly on either the AHA/Homchick 
proposal or the general idea of a procedural/substantive distinction.  
Some high-profile cases have offered CMS and the DOJ the opportu-
nity to incorporate that distinction into their rationale for the penalty 
calculation.  For example, the DOJ settled with Detroit Medical Cen-
ter (DMC) for $30 million in a case involving a mixture of procedural 
and substantive issues.280  Rather than categorize the unsigned leases 
that were not below fair market value separately from the other 
agreements that arguably were, the DOJ press release lumped all of 
the infractions together, stating simply that “improper financial rela-
tionships between health care providers and their referral sources can 
corrupt a physician’s judgment about the patient’s true healthcare 
needs.”281  Also, if the DOJ settlement amount reflected any discount 
on the penalties in recognition of DMC’s voluntary disclosure, the 
press release made no mention of it.  This lack of a distinction leaves 
providers with no confidence that inadvertent errors will be treated 
more leniently than intentional attempts to defraud the government.  A 
demonstration project offers the opportunity to make the important 
distinction between intentional actions and innocent errors. 
 
  
 277 Id. at 3. 
 278 AHA Letter, supra note 8, at 3. 
 279 Id. 
 280 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Justice, Detroit Medical Center Pays U.S. $30 
Million to Settle False Claims Act Allegations (Dec. 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov.opa/pr/2010/December/10-civ-1484.html.  
 281 Id. (quoting Tony West, Assistant Attorney General for the DOJ Civil 
Division). 
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3. Explicit Statements Offering Tangible Bene-
fits for Self-Disclosure 
The simplest improvement CMS could make to the SRDP is to 
make the kinds of statements about the SRDP that the OIG and New 
York OMIG have made about their protocols.  Whether the differ-
ences between the CMS, OIG, and New York OMIG protocols truly 
signal a different approach or are merely an oversight, they have cer-
tainly been interpreted by the provider community as significant.282  
The contrast between the agencies is especially striking in light of the 
fact that the OIG protocol deals with potential criminal liability under 
the Anti-Kickback statute while CMS deals with a civil statute.  CMS 
could add clarity and consistency to the government’s handling of 
health-care providers’ self-disclosures by simply stating their willing-
ness to settle a claim for less than the face value of the penalties. 
CMS should also expand the list of mitigating factors that it will 
consider to include some of those suggested by the AHA:  
 
• whether the parties’ failure to meet all of the pre-
scribed criteria in an applicable exception was due 
to an inadvertent error or an intentional act, 
• whether corrective action was taken by the parties,  
• whether the services provided were reasonable and 
medically necessary,  
• whether the care was sought in an emergency 
situation, and  
• whether the Medicare program or any beneficiar-
ies suffered any harm from the provider’s ac-
tions.283 
 
D. Measuring the Results of a Demonstration Project 
As part of each of its previous demonstration projects, CMS de-
veloped criteria for determining the success of the project.  The CMS 
staff is best positioned to determine specific measures that would be 
most helpful in evaluating any project.  CMS should, at a minimum, 
consider the amount of money recovered during the demonstration 
period, along with the number of providers participating, as compared 
to SRDP results to date.  CMS should choose states for the project 
  
 282 See Conn, supra note 219, at 25 (analogizing provider navigation between 
multiple disclosure protocols with ancient Greek sailors navigating between two 
mythological sea monsters, Scylla and Charybdis, poised to devour sailors). 
 283 AHA Letter, supra note 8, at 3. 
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that include a variety of demographics, including hospitals in rural, 
urban, and suburban settings.  Just as CMS consulted with trade 
groups, providers’ counsel, and others in the development of previous 
demonstration projects,284 it should include similar stakeholders when 
developing this project.  In fact, the ACA mandates that CMS consult 
with such groups in the development of any demonstration project.285  
Since the AHA and the AHLA, among many other groups and indi-
viduals, have been very active to date on self-disclosure issues, it is 
likely that those groups would be willing to assist in the development 
of a good demonstration project model. 
CONCLUSION 
CMS’s approach to provider self-disclosure of failure to comply 
with the Stark Law appears to be based on an assumption by the gov-
ernment that providers will disclose merely because the law says they 
must.  However, providers do consider the advantages and disadvan-
tages of compliance with laws.  In the case of Stark self-disclosure, 
there are few advantages for providers, and a great many significant 
disadvantages.  The CMS self-disclosure protocol punishes health-
care providers heavily who disclose even very minor violations of the 
Stark Law.  It also fails to distinguish between simple procedural fail-
ings and more significant noncompliance.  Furthermore, use of the 
SRDP invites virtually unlimited government scrutiny, a dangerous 
prospect at best for any provider. 
CMS would do well to heed Benjamin Franklin’s advice about us-
ing honey rather than vinegar to catch flies.  The self-disclosure pro-
tocol should be revised to establish a two-track system for disclosure 
that distinguishes between procedural and substantive violations of the 
Stark Law and a flat penalty for procedural violations.  The govern-
ment does not have the resources to police how every dollar of the 
enormous Medicare program budget is spent.  Therefore, it should do 
everything possible to encourage health-care providers to police them-
selves.  Self-disclosure of minor procedural violations of the Stark law 
would improve recovery of federal program dollars, encourage pro-
vider integrity, and avoid unnecessary expenditures for enforcement.  
  
 284 See Press Release, NJ Hospital Ass’n, Medicare Picks NJ to Test Innova-
tive Incentive System (Aug. 18, 2009), available at 
http://www.njha.com/press/PressRelease.aspx?id=7575 (NJ Hospital Ass’n spear-
headed efforts to win waiver from CMS to test a gainsharing initiative, aimed at re-
ducing health-care costs while maintaining quality of care). 
 285 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 
3021(a), 124 Stat. 119, 389 (2010) (to be codified 42 U.S.C. 1315(a)(3)). 
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A revised self-disclosure protocol offers the opportunity for providers 
to become partners with the government in assuring program integrity, 
at least with respect to the large number of minor violations of the 
Stark law.  This change would enable regulators to focus their limited 
resources on investigating and prosecuting providers who seek to in-
tentionally defraud government health-care programs. 
The ACA’s emphasis on using demonstration projects to test new 
ideas for improving the federal health-care programs offers CMS an 
opportunity to establish a demonstration project to test these reforms.  
The demonstration project model would limit potential dangers to 
program integrity.  It would also enable government officials to learn 
a great deal about common Stark issues that providers encounter.  If 
the demonstration project reveals issues that should be investigated, 
the government would then be in a better position to do so. 
The fact that fewer than one hundred providers have taken advan-
tage of the Stark self-disclosure protocol shows that vinegar is not 
attracting providers’ disclosures.  It is time for CMS to try a little 
honey in the controlled environment of a demonstration project.  If the 
disclosure project proves out Ben Franklin’s aphorism as predicted 
here, taxpayers and health-care providers alike will benefit. 
    
